

# CURRENT AND FUTURE READINESS OF THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS

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## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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FEBRUARY 15, 2007  
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# CONTENTS

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## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

### CURRENT AND FUTURE READINESS OF THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS

FEBRUARY 15, 2007

	Page
Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Accompanied by LTG Stephen M. Speakes, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 .....	5
Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant, United States Marine Corps ...	7

(III)



## **CURRENT AND FUTURE READINESS OF THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS**

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**THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2007**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCain, Warner, Sessions, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Micah H. Harris, and Benjamin L. Rubin.

Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman, assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I. Peterson and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M. Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; John Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

# **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We welcome this morning to our committee General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps. We note that this may be General Schoomaker's final appearance before this committee as the Army's Chief of Staff before he retires for the second time, after over 35 years of uniformed service. We are pleased that we could meet with you, General, before you pass leadership of the Army to General Casey, not only because we want to discuss Army readiness today, but also to express our gratitude to you for your lifetime of service to this Nation, to our soldiers, and to their families. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, of course, General Conway. We will be seeing more of you, but we are also grateful that you could make it today.

We note we believe that among our observers this morning are nine members of the parliament of the Republic of Montenegro. Are they here? They are here. We welcome you to visit our committee, to see how we operate, and hopefully to get some benefit out of it. We would be interested in your reaction at some point as to what you see and what your thoughts are about how we do operate here, and we would be interested as to how you operate back home in Montenegro. We welcome you.

Today's hearing examines the current and future readiness of our ground forces. Over the last 3 years the rotation of Army and Marine personnel in units into and out of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have put extraordinary pressures and stress on all aspects of military readiness. The readiness of our forces deployed to war zones should never be in question. The recent Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) report identifies problems with force protection equipment shortages in Iraq and Afghanistan. Press reports expose persistent shortages of armored Humvees and armor protection kits for Humvees and other vehicles. We also continue to receive complaints highlighting equipment items requested by deployed troops that appear to be unavailable in the supply system.

While many of these reports are anecdotal, we cannot ignore them. In some cases there are limitations in production capacity or lead times that we cannot do anything about in the short term, but some of these issues can be addressed by action of Congress and DOD. We want to continue to work with the Army and the Marine Corps to resolve as many of these issues as possible as we move forward, and we look forward to the remarks of our witnesses in this regard.

I am going to repeat what many, I think all, members of this committee have said many times in the past, which is, Congress is going to provide whatever forces in harm's way need. We are particularly concerned that in order to sustain the necessary higher readiness levels in our deployed forces the readiness of our non-deployed forces has steadily declined. Less ready non-deployed forces makes getting those units fully equipped and trained for the next deployment that much more difficult and that much more risky.

The President's plan to surge an additional five Army brigades and three Marine battalions and General Petraeus's request to get them into Iraq as quickly as possible puts pressure on an already

strained training and equipment readiness situation. We are concerned that deploying units will not have the required equipment and the time to train with that equipment before they are sent into harm's way.

This morning we will be looking for answers and hopefully assurances from the two uniformed leaders directly responsible for the readiness of our ground forces that surge units will deploy fully trained and equipped before they are deployed into Iraq. Simply stated, our ground forces are stretched thin and equipment is wearing out faster than planned and is not being replaced in a timely manner, which raises questions about the Nation's readiness to deal with other contingencies in a world which has many dangers and uncertainties.

In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee last month, both General Schoomaker and General Conway were clear in their apprehensions about the short and long-term risks resulting from the lower readiness levels of our non-deployed forces. General Conway indicated that the Marine Corps, historically the force the Nation calls upon first, would respond more slowly if needed to meet another contingency. General Schoomaker was direct in his concern for the, quote, "strategic depth" of our Army and its readiness, in other words whether it is able to commit forces to another contingency if necessary.

General Schoomaker and General Conway, we share your concerns for the readiness shortfalls of our current forces and the unacceptable risks which result. We are also concerned whether the administration's proposal to increase the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps would simply create a larger version of a less ready force. Army and Marine Corps plans for expansion must be comprehensive, detailed, and fully resourced. Congress must know what you need to bring our current and expanded ground forces to the levels of strength and readiness necessary to meet our National security requirements into the future.

We cannot solve readiness issues merely by increasing the size of the force, unless we have sufficient time and money to equip and sustain that force. So we look forward to discussing these issues with you both today and in the days ahead.

Senator McCain.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN**

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for scheduling this important hearing to focus on the readiness of our ground forces.

I would like to welcome both the witnesses and, General Schoomaker, I know I speak for all Americans when we express our appreciation for your long and dedicated and courageous service to our Nation. We know you will continue to contribute for many years to come. We thank you for your great service to our Nation.

Since the attacks on September 11, our military has been active in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world. Our servicemembers—Active, Reserve, and Guard—have responded magnificently to our Nation's call, often undertaking multiple or extended deployments, sometimes with very short notice, and performing with the utmost

professionalism that reflects credit on their individual service and on the great traditions of our Nation's military services.

There should be no doubt that difficult work lies ahead, but, as General Petraeus said when he assumed command in Iraq last week, "Hard is not hopeless." The operations of the last 5 years have strained both our personnel and our equipment. We all know that. While our men and women in uniform are in harm's way, there has also been a serious decline in the readiness of our non-deployed units both in equipment and training.

I hope we do not spend our time here looking back at mistakes that have been made over the last few years and fail to focus on the critical readiness issues we are facing in the here and now. We must not forget that we are in a very long war against an uncertain enemy as our Nation is about to implement a new military strategy in Iraq, one that could provide Iraq with the security necessary to provide sufficient breathing space to the Iraqi government that facilitates national reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

The President's recent decision to increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps is a vital part of the readiness remedy. Some of us have been calling for this for a number of years. This increase will help ease the strain on our deploying forces, giving them more time between deployments to rest and retrain. It should also reduce our reliance on our Reserve and Guard forces, who have met the Nation's call heroically. Finally, this increase will ensure we have enough forces available to meet other threats as they arrive.

Unfortunately, this increase in forces cannot occur soon enough. It will take time to recruit, train, and equip these new forces. I am concerned about the readiness of our forces between now and when these new units come on line. I hope our witnesses today will address how they plan to improve our readiness in the short term as well as how they plan to address the challenges in increasing the force structure over the next several years.

As Congress conducts oversight of defense spending, we should all take measures to ensure that the services are receiving the absolute most value for every tax dollar, and of course we want to eliminate duplicative and unnecessary programs. As you are aware, I have long advocated for reform in both the budgeting and the acquisition process. In this year's budget request the services presented long lists of priorities that were left without funding. I am concerned about the size of these unfunded requests lists, particularly that of the Army. The Army's budget request has increased significantly in recent years, as has the supplemental funding request, and yet the Army's unfunded requirements list increased by almost \$3 billion. I hope, General Schoomaker, that you can explain to the committee why that is.

I have a number of other concerns that the witnesses will be asked to address. You should expect questions on your services' readiness to respond to the President's plan for Iraq on prescribed time lines, the number of waivers granted to Army recruits, Humvee armor kits, and the very large unfunded requirement of Mine Resistant Ambush Protective (MRAP) vehicles and why those vehicles were not in the regular budget request. I look forward to your testimony.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
 Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.  
 General Schoomaker.

**STATEMENT OF GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY LTG STEPHEN M. SPEAKES, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-8**

General SCHOOMAKER. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee: Thanks very much for the opportunity to appear before today and represent the Army. I will be very concise here. I have submitted a statement for the record that I hope you will accept.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record.

General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you.

I would like to just express my sincere thanks upfront for the great support over the last 4 years that the Army has received from this committee and to thank you for your kind words and to express my appreciation for having the great privilege that I have enjoyed of serving the young men and women and their families of the United States Army during my tenure.

So I look forward to answering your questions and I thank you again for your support.

[The prepared statement of General Schoomaker follows:]

**PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of our Secretary, Dr. Francis Harvey, and the more than 1 million Active, Guard, and Reserve soldiers, and civilians of the United States Army, serving around the globe, I welcome the opportunity to discuss the need to improve Army readiness, to increase strategic depth, and to decrease our overall strategic risk.

We are in a dangerous, uncertain, and unpredictable time. As we continue our mission worldwide and prepare to increase our commitment in Iraq, we face challenges that exceed the level of demand envisioned in the recent quadrennial review of defense strategy.

Strategy involves establishing a proper balance among ends, ways, and means. Policy and strategy discussions often focus on ends and ways and fail to sufficiently address means. The recent decisions by the President and the Secretary of Defense—to grow our ground forces and to assure access to all components of our force—will help to establish the balance required to meet and sustain high levels of strategic demand for Army forces by providing additional means.

We have received considerable support from this committee and Congress to increase the readiness of our Army. As a result, the soldiers we have deployed into current theaters of operation are the best trained, best equipped, and best led we have ever fielded. As I have explained in previous testimony, our immediate challenge lies in the readiness of our nondeployed forces. We will need your continued support in seven key areas to restore the strategic depth of our Army necessary to respond decisively to potential strategic contingencies:

First, recent decisions to expand the Army reflect the clear recognition of the dangers we face and the strain that 5 years of sustained demand has placed on our All-Volunteer Force. We plan to grow six new Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and enabling organizations in our active component, and other enabling organizations in our Army National Guard and Army Reserve. This will expand our rotational pool to 76 BCTs and more than 200 enabling organizations in the operational force of the Total Army. Our goal is to provide a continuous supply of 20–21 BCTs to meet global commitments. We remain committed to generating whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped—that are fully ready for the challenges they will face. This will require a national commitment to sustain predictable resourcing over time and to build our force in a balanced, coordinated fashion, while providing adequately for the needs of our All-Volunteer Soldiers and their families.

Second, in the near term, to prosecute the long war, and to sustain the full range of our global commitments, we must have all components of the Army—Active,

Guard, and Reserve—ready and able to deploy together. The changes in Reserve component mobilization policies, recently announced by Secretary Gates, are essential. Our Reserve components comprise 55 percent of our Army's capabilities. We must fully enable them to perform their new role as an integral part of our operationally deployable force. These new policies will provide predictability and facilitate the deployment of trained, ready, and cohesive units, while decreasing the burden on our Soldiers and their families. We are working to implement these changes rapidly and will require continued congressional support to do so.

Third, with the support of this committee and Congress, we have been provided the resources needed to restore battle losses and repair worn equipment through an aggressive reset program. We are well ahead of schedule in executing these funds in fiscal year 2007. In just the first 4 months, we have already obligated \$11.8 billion of the \$17.1 billion appropriated.

As I testified last year, we anticipate that our fiscal year 2008 reset requirements will be approximately \$13.5 billion—a figure that will increase as we plus up forces in current theaters of operation and increase the size of our Army. Because the replacement of equipment can take up to 3 years following the commitment of funds, we seek to make this funding available for use as soon as possible. To overcome the unprecedented stress being placed on our equipment today, reset funding will be required for a minimum of 2 to 3 years beyond the duration of the current conflict.

Fourth, with your support, we have made great progress in increasing soldier and unit effectiveness through our modernization efforts. As I have said before, we have historically entered conflicts flatfooted. This current conflict is no exception. Investment accounts were under funded by approximately \$100 billion during the previous decade, resulting in nearly \$56 billion in equipment shortages across the Army. To meet combatant commanders' immediate wartime needs, we pooled equipment from across the force to equip soldiers deploying into harm's way. This practice, which we are continuing today, increases risk for our next-to-deploy units, and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies.

The changed conditions of warfare necessitate that we can no longer accept risk in how we equip our combat support and combat service support units. There are no front lines in today's battle space. We must equip all units with force protection, night vision goggles, crew served weapons, radios, and other critical items needed to operate. Your continued support is helping to fix what I call our "holes in the force." I ask you to increase your support for this effort as we work to break the historical cycle of unpreparedness. We must remain committed to investing in technologies and equipment that enable our most important asset—the soldier—to remain ahead of our adversaries who are quickly adapting their methods, tactics, and tools of warfare. Investing sufficiently in our future readiness is a strategic necessity—which must be viewed as a matter of priority not just affordability.

Fifth, our ability to grow the force to meet rotational requirements is jeopardized by the \$2 billion reduction in our Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) account in the fiscal year 2007 appropriations process. We appreciate that Congress supports funding military construction to the requested levels in the continuing resolution. Just as critical, however, is the timely funding of the associated BRAC. It is an essential and inextricable part of our plan to ensure growth and improve readiness, not just a statutory requirement that must be met by September 2011. We have developed a carefully synchronized, closely knitted stationing plan to enable us to meet our global commitments while fighting the long war. Current delays in funding fiscal year 2007 BRAC projects limit our ability to build our modular force and to deliver quality of life improvements which our soldiers and families both need and deserve. I have addressed my concerns in two separate letters. In November, I co-authored a "16 star" letter with the other service chiefs, and in December, Secretary Harvey and I reemphasized the significant impact of this delay. I recently met with Senator Reid, the Senate Majority Leader, to emphasize how imperative it is to fund these requirements without delay, especially now while we are at war. To properly house, train, and prepare our soldiers, we urge Congress, at the very first opportunity, to restore BRAC funding to levels requested in the 2007 President's budget.

Sixth, we will require access to supplemental funding for fiscal year 2007 by April, and possibly sooner, to properly sustain the Army. In June of last year, we really had to "slam the brakes" on expenditures when supplemental appropriations were not provided when expected. That timing, in combination with the reductions in the fiscal year 2006 budget request, forced us to institute a civilian hiring freeze; terminate temporary employees; tightly control travel expenses; and delay information technology purchases. It was a painful, and avoidable, exercise. We cannot repeat last year's near disastrous "cash flow" experience and meet the increased operational demands now facing us.

Finally, we must fully resource the Army to enable it to simultaneously grow, transform, and modernize while effectively fighting the global war on terrorism. The Army remains committed to providing the best land force possible to support the Nation's worldwide interests. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget, together with anticipated global war on terrorism funding, sets the Army on the right path to achieving these objectives, and I ask you to fully fund these critical requirements. I recently responded to Representative Hunter's request to identify unfunded requirements. In copies provided to this committee, I identified over \$10 billion in requirements that could be accelerated to further enhance our readiness and restore our Army's strategic depth.

The fundamental challenge impacting Army readiness and strategic depth is the need to establish a proper balance between strategy and resources. Had we funded the Army to requested levels in recent years, and endorsed policies to assure access to all of our capability, we would be in a better strategic posture today. I am greatly encouraged by the recent actions of Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense which reflect clear recognition of the compelling need to rectify our current situation. I look forward to working with this Congress to enhance the readiness and strategic depth of our Army.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General.  
General Conway.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC,  
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

General CONWAY. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to report to you today. When I last testified before you at my confirmation hearing, I pledged to always provide you frank and honest assessments of the state of the Marine Corps, and I come to you today with that thought in mind.

Your Marine Corps is currently engaged in what I believe to be the first battles of a Long War against Islamic extremists. Alongside some of our friends and allies, we have been in that fight now for almost 5 years. Though the troops in the operating forces are being pushed hard by the operational tempo and the frequency of deployments, morale has never been higher because they believe they are making a difference.

They also believe, ladies and gentlemen, that the people of the United States and its government are behind them. The evidence of that support is everywhere to be seen: the fielding of new materiel and equipment to make their mission's success more certain and to protect them from enemy blasts, the reset of the force so as to be able to accomplish follow-on missions throughout the globe, and most recently the request by the Secretary of Defense to grow our end strength.

This end strength increase to 202,000 marines will go a long way towards reducing the strain both on individual marines and on the institution. This plan will gradually decrease the deployment-to-dwell ratio of some of our high operational tempo units. Currently many of those units are deployed for 7 months and home for only 7, some even less time, before they return to combat.

While the conflict in Iraq demonstrates the uncontested need for boots on the ground even in modern day warfare, our current request for an end strength increase is what the Marine Corps needs to be prepared to respond whenever and wherever our vital national interests are threatened, not just in Iraq. Our Corps by law is, quote, "the Nation's shock troops." These additional marines will allow us the additional dwell time needed to train at home station

and sharpen those skills that could be required of us in the next contingency, thereby reducing future operational and strategic risks.

With over 70 percent of our proposed end strength comprised of first-term marines, we are making plans for the necessary increases in recruiting and retention, which will be challenging. But our standards will remain high. We will need the continued support of Congress for strong reenlistment bonuses and other recruiting programs such as advertising, which will be essential for us to continue to bring aboard the best that America has to offer.

Turning to the plus-up operations in Iraq, approximately 4,000 marines are affected. Three of our units will be extended by 45 to 60 days. This extension will impact our marines and their families, but we have been emphatic about keeping our families informed of the details. We believe that unit programs and family support systems back home have already helped marines and families meet the challenges associated with this extension.

As an aside, there has been some misunderstanding in the media that our end strength increase is directly tied to the plus-up operation in Iraq. The fact is that our request for additional marines is separate from, indeed it predates by several weeks, that ongoing operation.

Moreover, there has been some concern expressed that perhaps the battalions moved forward in the rotation for the plus-up operations might not be fully trained or equipped for the fight. Ladies and gentlemen, let me clarify that the additional marines going into the al-Anbar Province have indeed had their training schedules adjusted, but those schedules include all five phases of our pre-deployment training package. Cross-leveling of equipment is now complete and we know the battalions will lack two equipment items as a result of manufacturing unavailability and those are the latest generation sniper and spotter scopes.

Ladies and gentlemen, your marines recognize that this is an important time in history to serve our country. The majority of them joined the Corps after the Nation was at war, knowing that they would most likely go into harm's way. They joined with the understanding of what was expected of them and have shouldered that duty with courage and determination. They are truly a special breed of America's warriors. It is in their behalf that I come before you today to answer your questions and to help all understand how we can best support these tremendous young marines and sailors in combat.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Conway follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee; during my confirmation process and in our subsequent conversations, I have pledged to provide you forthright and honest assessments of your Corps, and I welcome this opportunity to report to you today.

Your Marine Corps has been fully engaged in the Long War—in campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as throughout the world. The challenges we face are of global scale and scope; this war is a multi-faceted, generational struggle that will not be won in one battle, in one country, or by one method. Throughout this war, your Marine Corps has been able to rapidly adapt to challenging strategic conditions and wide-ranging threats. This past year, you have seen evidence of this not only

in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in Lebanon (where we were partners in the largest noncombatant evacuation since Vietnam); in the southern Pacific—as part of humanitarian assistance and relief efforts in the wake of multiple natural disasters; and around the globe in scores of theater security cooperation engagements.

Your marines are a tough breed and will always do what it takes, but there is a tangible price we pay for this excellence—both in terms of personal sacrifice and in the cumulative effect on our equipment. It is our moral imperative to support our marines in combat to the hilt—we are always mindful that our forward-deployed marines and sailors in combat must be our number one priority. As a Corps, we remain true to our congressionally-mandated mission “to be most ready when the Nation is least ready”; thus providing the Nation a two-fisted capability—adept at counterinsurgency as well as major conventional operations.

#### I. RIGHT-SIZE OUR CORPS

To meet the demands of the Long War and the inevitable contingencies that will arise, our Corps must be sufficiently manned as well as trained and properly equipped. The Corps’ personnel policies, organizational construct, and training must be resourced so that marines are able to operate at the sustained rate as well as meet the occasional “surge.”

##### *Strain on our Individual Marines*

Despite an unparalleled personnel tempo, the morale of our marines and their families remains high. There are however, leading indicators showing signs of strain that concern us. To avoid an adverse toll on our marines and their families, and to prevent a decrease in readiness, a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio goal was established for all Active component forces. The goal is for every 7 months a marine is deployed, he or she will be back at home station for 14 months—providing needed rest, family time, and the opportunity to train for a variety of missions.

##### *Strain on the Institution*

Current wartime deployments dictate a singular focus to prepare units for their next rotations conducting counterinsurgency operations. This focus and the current 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratio of many units threatens the individual and unit skills needed for Marine Corps missions such as combined-arms maneuver, mountain warfare, amphibious, and jungle operations. To fulfill our mandate as the Nation’s Force in Readiness, our deployment cycles must not only support training for irregular warfare, but also provide sufficient time for recovery and maintenance as well as training for other contingency missions. By increasing the dwell time for our units, we can accomplish the more comprehensive training needed for the sophisticated skill sets that have enabled Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) to consistently achieve success in all types of battle. Our goal is to increase dwell time and achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for our Active Forces.

#### II. END STRENGTH INCREASE

The recently proposed increase of Marine Corps Active component end strength from approximately 180,000 to 202,000 marines will go a long way toward reducing the strain on the individual Marines and the institution as a whole. I need to emphasize, the underlying requirement for an end strength increase is separate from, indeed it pre-dates, the “plus-up” operation in Iraq. Our first task will be to build three new infantry battalions and elements of their supporting structure—approximately 4,000 marines. We will then systematically increase the number of marines on a schedule of approximately 5,000 per year. This end strength will do more than just add the much needed infantry battalions—we will balance the MAGTF and reduce the strain on military occupational specialties that are experiencing a 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratio or less. These include rotary wing squadrons, military police, intelligence units, engineers, and other combat support and combat service support fields. Currently many of these units are deployed for 7 months and only home for 5.

End strength (thousands)	Fiscal Year						
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Fiscal Year 2007 Baseline .....	175	175	175	175	175	175	175
PB08 Baseline Increase .....	0	5	19	24	27	27	27
Subtotal Active Force .....	175	180	194	199	202	202	202

End strength (thousands)	Fiscal Year						
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Funded in Supplemental .....	9	9	0	0	0	0	0
Total USMC Active Force .....	184	189	194	199	202	202	202

For fiscal year 2007, the Active component will grow by 9,000 marines. Supplemental appropriations will fund this growth. In fiscal year 2008, the end strength increase will be funded by a combination of baseline and supplemental appropriations. In fiscal years 2009 and beyond, baseline appropriations will fund the end strength increase.

This end strength is important not only for the current requirements, but also to posture the Marine Corps for future mission requirements as the Nation's force in readiness.

#### *Reserve Component End Strength*

Our efforts in the Long War have been a Total Force effort, with our Reserves once again performing with grit and determination. Recent policy changes within the Department of Defense allow us to access the Reserve Forces as they were structured to be employed—to augment and reinforce our Active component forces. To this end, my goal is to sustain a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio within our Reserve component. As our Active Force increases in size, the reduced reliance on our Reserve Forces should allow us even more “buffer” as we work to maintain the proper deployment-to-dwell ratio for our Reserves.

### III. PLUS-UP OPERATIONS

Currently, the Marine Corps has approximately 4,000 marines affected by plus-up operations in Iraq. The affected units will be extended by 45–60 days. This extension will influence our marines and their families, but we are ardently keeping our families informed of the details. We believe that family support systems and unit programs back home will help marines and families meet the concomitant challenges of the extension. Further, between their return and next deployment, the addition of new infantry battalions will allow these units to lengthen their time at home.

Battalions moved forward in the rotation cycle will complete all required predeployment training that fully qualifies them for employment. These battalions will be subject to the same predeployment training standards as their fellow Marines. We have accelerated the normal cycle through our main mission rehearsal exercise, Mojave Viper, to accommodate consistent training for all units rotating into theater.

The accelerated battalions will deploy with equipment from their home stations, and the additional equipment required will be provided by cross-leveling assets in theater as well as leveraging equipment already positioned forward. This has resulted in some home station shortfalls and has hindered some stateside units' ability to train for other missions and contingencies. While the readiness of deployed units remains high, we have experienced a decrease in the readiness of some non-deployed units.

There are no Marine Corps Reserve units involved in the plus-up operations.

### IV. MANNING THE FORCE

An important factor in sustaining a viable force is continuing to recruit and retain qualified young men and women with the right character, commitment, and drive to become marines. With over 70 percent of the proposed Marine Corps end strength increase comprised of first-term marines, both recruiting and retention efforts are being challenged. A major part of this effort will involve increased funding for both the Enlistment Bonus and Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs that we included in the President's budget request. We need the strong support of Congress to achieve continued success.

Purposefully exceeding Department of Defense quality standards, we continue to recruit the best of America into our ranks—in fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps achieved over 100 percent of our Active component accession goal. The Marine Corps Reserve also achieved 100 percent of its recruiting goals, but Reserve officer numbers remain challenging because our primary accession source is from officers that leave active duty. We appreciate the continued authorization for a Selected Reserve Officer Affiliation Bonus in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007—it continues to contribute in this critical area.

We forecast that both Active and Reserve recruiting will remain difficult, particularly when viewed through the lens of new missions to meet the increased end strength of the Marine Corps. We will need the continued support of Congress for enlistment bonuses and other recruiting programs, such as advertising, which will be essential for us to continue meeting these growth challenges.

Retention is the other important part of manning the force. In fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps exceeded its retention goals for both First-Term and Career Forces. For fiscal year 2007, we expect to exceed our goals again. This success can be attributed to the Marine Corps' judicious use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus. To keep the very best of our marines, the President's budget increases the size of our bonus program in order to ensure that we have the right grade and military occupational specialty mix to support the growing force. Not only will we have to retain more first-term marines, but also we will have to increase the number of marines reenlisting at the 8- and 12-year mark. This will require us to shift more funding toward key areas in the career force.

#### V. EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 202,000 MARINE CORPS AND THE IRAQ PLUS-UP

The conflict in Iraq and the greater long war on terror have increased our equipment maintenance and replacement costs far beyond what is available in our baseline budget. The challenge of restoring and maintaining traditional capabilities while fielding new capabilities to ensure success in the Long War has come to be known as "resetting the force." With your help over the last 2 years, we have begun to make progress in restoring our equipment readiness, but there is much work to be done if we are to win the current fight and still be able to respond to other challenges that face our country.

Slow deliveries of needed equipment have forced us to cross-level and redistribute equipment to ensure that our Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-bound units have their full complement of equipment. This has resulted in home station shortfalls and hindered some stateside units' ability to train for other missions and contingencies. Personnel and equipment needed for mobile training teams and other nontraditional employment in theater has had a similar impact. While the readiness of deployed units and units preparing to deploy has remained high, we have experienced a decrease in nondeployed units' readiness.

To remedy the near term decline in readiness, we have received \$10.2 billion in funding to reset the force. Deliveries of equipment procured with reset funding are proceeding; however, increases in deployment and operating tempo will slow our efforts to reset the force. Equipment originally planned to replace home station shortfalls and prepositioning programs will now be used to address unit equipment requirements associated with the Iraq plus-up.

#### *Equipping a 202,000 Marine Corps*

In order to best equip proposed end strength increases, the Marine Corps has a phased approach across fiscal years 2008–2011 that is synchronized with increases in personnel. We have established an Integrated Process Team to identify the units and associated personnel required to support the Marine Corps growth to 202,000. Once the units associated with this increase are identified, a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities analysis will be conducted to determine the full spectrum of support required. While the vast majority of required equipment will be the procurement of additional existing weapon systems, when it makes sense, we will procure next generation equipment to keep pace with technological improvements. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget includes \$2.2 billion in procurement, Marine Corps to fund the items necessary to equip the additional marines.

#### *Equipment in Support of Additional Troops in Iraq*

Equipment in support of additional troops in Iraq is acquired through a variety of sources. These include cross-leveling of equipment from within the Marine Force Component Command (MARFORs), cross-leveling within theater, pending procurement deliveries, Maritime Prepositioning Stores, Depot Maintenance Master Work Schedule, Forward In Stores stocks, and a variety of other smaller sources.

The deployment of additional Marine Forces to Iraq will have some impact upon the Marine Corps' reset efforts. The goal of our reset effort is to ensure the Corps is equipped to perform both global war on terrorism and other future missions; reset is not intended solely to meet the demands of OIF. We do not envision our reset effort changing or our reset requirements growing because of the force increase. We do expect a dip in nondeployed unit readiness as we prioritize available equipment to outfit forward deployed units; however, this effect will be temporary and the delivery of new equipment funded by previous appropriations will increase Marine

Corps readiness. The only known long term effect will be the increased attrition we expect as more equipment is employed in the hazardous and severe environment in Iraq. We have not yet fully assessed the potential impact of any increased attrition on our reset requirement but we anticipate that it will be small relative to the complete reset effort.

The Marine Corps prioritizes the distribution of available equipment to units according to their assigned mission and the position in the deployment cycle. Those units next to deploy receive priority for available equipment as they begin their predeployment training. Most items are available in sufficient quantities to equip all units regardless of status, but many units will lack high demand or theater specific items such as the uparmored HMMWV. To ensure that adequate equipment is available to equip every unit, we embarked on a long-term reset effort. This effort is well underway and Congress has been very responsive to our requests. In fiscal year 2006 and thus far in fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps has received \$10.2 billion towards our reset needs and over half—\$6.8 billion has already been committed or obligated. The Corps has taken delivery of large quantities of new equipment but much more will be delivered in the coming months. I believe that Marine Corps readiness will steadily increase and I am confident that we remain ready for all current and future missions.

#### *Personal Protective Equipment*

The Marine Corps currently has sufficient Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on-hand to outfit two additional infantry battalions. For plus-up operations in Iraq, the two additional battalions will receive protective equipment from home station Consolidated Issue Facilities (CIFs), prior to deploying to Iraq. This emerging requirement may require some cross-leveling between CIFs, but sufficient quantities are available for prescribed PPE. The Side Small Arms Protective Insert (Side SAPI) is currently an in-theater issued asset and one that marines are not provided prior to deployment. Sufficient Side SAPIs are available in-theater to provide for issue to the two additional infantry battalions for the Iraq plus-up.

#### *Impact on Home Station*

Once equipment shortfalls are identified, Marine Forces Command and Marine Forces Pacific will identify those items that have an adverse impact on predeployment training of units in subsequent rotations. Our supporting establishment in concert with Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC) and Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) will mitigate these shortages to the MARFORs through redirecting pending contract deliveries and depot maintenance cycles.

#### *High Demand Equipment*

Equipment in high demand continues to be monitored closely and critical shortfalls are filled through the process outlined above. In addition, new advances in technology have allowed for improved survivability. An example of this has been our progression in the armored vehicle from the basic HMMWV to the Marine Armor Kit (MAK), to the fully fielded M1114, to the new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles. Within the next 3–5 years, we expect the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) to be fielded, which will have the latest protection that science and technology can provide. This example shows how modern advances in technology along with the military partnering with industry have enhanced survivability on the battlefield.

To extend the life of high demand equipment, we have numerous programs in place. MCLC has established a forward maintenance augmentation program to conduct overflow of intermediate level maintenance in theater. We have established a Forward In Stores program designed to manage critical repair parts in theater. This has reduced the equipment repair time of selected critical high demand equipment. Our deployed forces also use the Army Materiel Command's forward maintenance capabilities. Another is the aggressive use of contracted logistics support capabilities. Additionally, we have a Principle End Item (PEI) rotation plan that allows critical assets to be systematically removed from the battlefield, sent back to the States, and inducted into depot level maintenance cycles. Currently, 56 separate equipment categories have been identified for induction into the PEI rotation plan. Our fiscal year 2008 PEI induction plan is an enhanced plan that identifies 128 separate equipment categories. This process allows for essential rebuild of those assets and an extension of their service life. While this depot level maintenance is being done, the latest technology available is being applied to ensure the best equipment available is returned to theater.

The two Marine Corps depots have rapidly realigned capability and capacity to meet immediate needs. This has been accomplished by overtime, additional shifts, and utilizing commercial vendors and other DOD depots. Currently, our depots are

not constrained by funding or capacity. It is logical to expect an increase in depot rebuild requirements as the Marine Corps increases its deployed battalions forward in Iraq, while concurrently executing a robust equipment rotation strategy for combat forces.

#### *Impact on Marine Corps Aviation Equipment*

The long war on terror has resulted in aircraft use rates far greater than designed or programmed on Marine Corps aircraft. All USMC aircraft are operating at two to four times their programmed rates; our unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadrons are flying at ten times their programmed rate. In order to meet demands of the current fight and posture ourselves for success in the Long War, we must husband these low density, high demand assets. The Marine Aviation Plan mitigation strategy sustains our legacy inventory while we simultaneously transition to new platforms to source the MAGTF and joint force in the future.

The timely support and execution of the Marine Aviation Plan will determine USMC aviation force readiness today and tomorrow. KC-130J, H-1, and MV-22 production lines are now active but funded below maximum capacity. Additionally, F/A-18D and CH-53E aircraft will reach the end of their service lives before replacement aircraft become available. These shortfalls underscore the urgency for the F-35B and CH-53K programs to remain on schedule.

Turn Around Ratio for all USMC helicopter and UAV squadrons as well as our air traffic control detachments and aviation logistics falls short of directed 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratios. Over the past year, many of these units have a dwell time less than 1:1 with most for 7 months and only home for 5. The combination of this deployment-to-dwell ratio and increased usage rates creates a cumulative effect that exacerbates the stress on some components of Marine aviation. Our end strength increase will include both aviation equipment and personnel increases to reduce this strain.

### VI. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR OUR MARINES AND THEIR FAMILIES

Our family support mechanisms remain robust and flexible and are continuously assessed to ensure sufficiency and relevancy to our wartime mission—particularly during crucial “rapid fire” operations. Though some Marine Corps families will be impacted by extended deployments, family support systems to meet this requirement are within Marine Corps capacity. We continue to provide emphasis on Combat/Operational Stress Control (COSC), Casualty Assistance, and support to our injured marines.

#### *Combat/Operational Stress Control*

Managing stress is vital to the Marine Corps as a fighting force and the long-term health and well-being of Marines and their families. The culture and climate of the Marine Corps must facilitate Marines and families seeking necessary help when their lives are not returning to normal. Unit leaders have the greatest potential to influence marines and their families and ensure they feel comfortable asking for help. COSC, therefore, is the responsibility of Marine leadership and includes support from medical personnel and chaplains.

#### *Casualty Assistance*

Each marine fatality is a tragic loss to his or her family and the Corps. We endeavor to honor their sacrifices with sincerity and commitment. Our Casualty Assistance Calls Officers are trained to treat next of kin and other family members as they would their own family. Each case is distinct, and assistance to surviving families must be carefully segmented and specifically adjusted to facilitate their transition through grief stages and completion of the casualty-notification process.

#### *Wounded Marines and Sailors*

The Marine For Life Injured Support program was developed to assist seriously and very seriously injured marines, sailors who have served or are serving with marines, and their families. Among other components, the program seeks to bridge the gap between military and the Department of Veterans Affairs medical care by providing individual support through the transition period. Additionally, I have directed creation of a Wounded Warrior Regiment to provide centralized oversight of care for our wounded marines and assist in the integration of their support with military, government, charitable, and civilian systems.

#### *Traumatic Brain Injury and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)*

Recent measures to mitigate the impact of traumatic brain injuries to individual marines and their units include release of a medical guidance letter from the medical officer of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has also implemented an im-

proved helmet pad system to decrease impact of injury from a blast or blow to the head.

The science of diagnosing and treating PTSD continues to evolve. Screening is taking place in theater and at home stations. Research and training are underway to identify risk and protective factors for PTSD, increase resilience to stress, and improve individual/leadership awareness, early identification, and psychological first aid for those who are stress-injured.

#### VII. CONCLUSION

Thank you for the opportunity to report to you on behalf of the valiant men and women of your Corps. They remain committed to their mission and know that the American people and its government support them in their endeavor. Your Corps stands ready to serve in any clime and place, but your continued support remains a vital and appreciated foundation to this Service.

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you.

We are going to have a little tricky schedule here this morning. We have two votes at 10:30, and we are just going to have to work around them the best we can. Hopefully, some of us could leave to vote at the beginning of the first vote and the end of the second vote so that we do not have to recess this hearing. We will try a 6-minute round, given our schedule this morning.

General Schoomaker, first is the current readiness of your non-deployed Army forces at an acceptable level?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, as I have testified in the past and as the chairman's risk assessment, which is classified, which you have, shows, I am not satisfied with the readiness of our non-deployed forces. I would say that the level of operations that we are now committed to further aggravates that.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you able to tell us in an unclassified setting what percentage of your Active Force is not deployed and what percentage of this nondeployed force is trained and ready for world-wide commitment?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, I have no concerns on the force that we deployed. They continue to be the very best trained, led, and equipped force. I do not think I can say in an unclassified forum any percentages of our nondeployed force. Needless to say, we are having to go to some extraordinary measures to make sure that we have the ability to respond properly.

Chairman LEVIN. Would you say that the percentage, although you cannot give it, that we are in worse shape now than 6 months ago?

General SCHOOMAKER. I would say the pressure on us has increased as a result of the level of operations, yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Conway, can you tell us whether or not the readiness of your nondeployed Marine Corps force is at an acceptable level?

General CONWAY. Sir, I would say it is acceptable, but I do have some concerns. It is not on a par with those forces that are deployed certainly, I think it is fair to say. In general terms, because we are in open session, I would say that our equipment status is pretty good. I think my largest concern probably has to do with training. When we are home for those 7, 8, 9 months, our focus is going back to Iraq and, as I mentioned in the opening statement, therefore we are not doing amphibious training, we are not doing mountain warfare training, we are not doing combined arms live

fire maneuver, such as one would need to be the case potentially in another type of contingency. So those are my concerns.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

The DOD's IG released a draft report in January indicating that troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, "experienced shortages of force protection equipment such as uparmored vehicles, electronic counter-measure devices, crew-served weapons, and communications equipment."

We also continue to see press reports of problems, including one in the Washington Post this week, in which, "Units in Iraq and Afghanistan lack more than 4,000 of the latest Humvee armor kit, known as fragmentation (FRAG) Kit 5." The Army released a statement also this week indicating that they produced sufficient armor kits for Humvees, but that installation will drag into the spring for Iraq and into the summer for Afghanistan. These delays, I know, are unacceptable to you and they are unacceptable to us.

I am wondering if you could tell us what your plans are to eliminate all force protection equipment shortages throughout the area of operations, both Iraq and Afghanistan? First General Schoomaker.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, first of all, I think you know that we did not concur with the DOD IG report, that we felt it was anecdotal in nature. It is clear that Afghanistan, because of the recent requirements coming out of Afghanistan with the train and equip mission, we do have some work to make up there and we are doing that. However, in Iraq I stand on what I said before. There is no shortage of equipment to perform the missions that are being conducted today, to being able to cover the surge with sufficient uparmored Humvees, weapons. There is no problem on personal individual body armor and this kind of thing.

We do have the steel and the kits to complete all of the vehicles that are in country right now. We are close to a little over 14,000 vehicles in country. As correctly stated, we are applying kits to about 3,000 of those. But there are adequate—12,000 vehicles over there that are adequate for the need, and we are working with General Petraeus very carefully to ensure nobody goes outside of protected space that is not adequately protected for the mission.

I am sorry?

Chairman LEVIN. That includes then this latest Humvee armor kit, that FRAG—

General SCHOOMAKER. It does. I am talking about FRAG Kit 5.

Chairman LEVIN. You are.

General SCHOOMAKER. We have been operating under an order that General Casey issued that nobody would leave protected space that was not in a level 1 uparmor. FRAG Kit 5 is an increased level of protection. We are now in my view approaching a point where nobody will leave protected space without FRAG Kit 5. This is a continuing process of improvement and the MRAP that we have asked for is an improvement over FRAG Kit 5. That is the next step that we want to go through on the path to an even better protected vehicle, the joint program, that we feel is necessary in the future.

The MRAP is a program we have had in the Army for quite some time. It is now a joint program with the Marine Corps. We have

almost 1,000 MRAP vehicles if you consider the Armored Security Vehicle (ASV), which is part of that program, and the route clearance equipment like Buffalos, Cougars, and RG-31s. We already have about a thousand of these in theater. So we are already on the path to the next step.

Chairman LEVIN. Just to complete that question, there was a quotation in the paper from General Speakes, I believe, if I can find that. Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, Deputy Chief of Staff, said that the Army, "does not have the armor kits and does not have the trucks," requiring units deploying to share with units already there.

What was he referring to?

General SCHOOMAKER. He is referring to the FRAG Kit 5 additions. Our biggest challenge, quite frankly, is in the medium tactical vehicles and the heavy tactical vehicles, the logistics vehicles, and that gap is being closed as well.

Chairman LEVIN. But he said that the Army does not have the armor kits. He is quoted as saying that the Army does not have the armor kits.

General SCHOOMAKER. We do not have the armor kits to complete the entire inventory in the Army, but we have focused these kits on the theater. Now, Major General Stephen M. Speakes, USA, is here. Do you want to clarify that?

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir.

Sir, it is my privilege to address you and, having seen my name in the press, I would appreciate the chance to correct the record. What I was illustrating when I talked about the depth of our planning was the commitment that this Army under General Schoomaker's lead and Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, to ensure that no soldier goes in harm's way untrained or unequipped. My responsibility is the equipping part of this thing.

The first thing we talked about is the concept of what we are doing right now to ensure that theater-provided equipment is made up for these additional brigades that are coming into theater. They do not have a unit to fall in on with whom they will exchange the equipment. We have to make sure those sets are put together.

We have a very, very detailed plan that essentially is aligned with each brigade to ensure that as that brigade arrives a full complement of equipment is waiting for them. The particular focus has been up-armored Humvees with the complete suite of equipment that is required. That is, a blue force tracking, that is a jamming device, that is a crew-served weapon. All that is now configured and prepared in echeloned order through the spring.

The issue that I identified—and I wanted to use this to give the American taxpayer confidence we have done our homework—was medium and heavy trucks is an issue. The problem right now is we do not have great surpluses of medium and heavy trucks waiting in Kuwait to issue additional brigades. So what we are doing right now is, able to equip the first elements, the first brigades that are deploying, with existing sets of heavy trucks.

What we identified was that at the tail end of this surge we have some work to do. The problem in creating these kits is industrial work. The factories are not producing that any more. We had pro-

duced enough for the theater and a comfortable surplus. The surge complicates that challenge.

What we are doing is two things. First, we are cross-leveling about 800 trucks out of more than 11,000 that are in theater right now. We have already received a detailed plan from Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). They have provided us the specifics on what trucks will be made available and when to make up those requirements. We then at the Army level are continuing now to start up another factory effort to ensure that additional kits are made ready. They will be installed and made ready in the summer. So what we will do in the near-term is cross-level, and in the long-term what we will do is generate new production and new capability.

Our point was that we stand behind our guarantee. We will do it right. We will ensure that no soldier operates without the correct equipment.

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you so much.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, could I just add real quick?

Chairman LEVIN. Sure.

General SCHOOMAKER. Going back, there is no soldier today that is in harm's way over there—we are in a foot race on the wheeled vehicles. But let me just reemphasize, we also are deploying tanks and Bradleys, Strykers, ASVs, and the rest of these vehicles which complement, actually are increased protection over Humvees and these trucks. Part of my concern is the fact that we have drawn on prepositioned stocks to be able to equip this force that is over there, which reduces our flexibility.

Chairman LEVIN. These are really important assurances to us. We are all very much concerned when we look at what is ahead of us, and we thank you both.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, General Schoomaker and General Conway.

We now plan to increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps. Are we going to have any difficulty recruiting these additional personnel? General?

General SCHOOMAKER. In my view, sir, we can accomplish what I said. 7,000 to 9,000 additional recruits a year, that is what we programmed for. This year some of that growth is in supplemental funding, but in future years all of that growth is going into the base budget.

Senator MCCAIN. But I mean, you believe we can recruit without having to provide additional incentives to serve?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I believe we can do it. Last year we had our best year in 9 years in the Active Force and the best year in 13 years in the National Guard. I believe we have exceeded our goal the first quarter of this year. We exceeded January. We are on path to exceed February—

Senator MCCAIN. But there is also information in the media that you are increasing the number of waivers, that the Army and Marine Corps are increasing the numbers of waivers in order to meet recruiting goals. Is there anything true to that?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, that is true. We have increased the number of waivers over the past year. But I can assure you that

every one of those is being looked at on an individual basis. We are tracking those soldiers through the system. We are seeing that the soldiers that we have waived are retaining in the force and not attriting, in other words, at the same percentage that other soldiers, and we believe that what we are doing is proper. We understand the concern, but it is getting a great deal of top attention in terms of what we are doing.

Senator MCCAIN. General Conway?

General CONWAY. Sir, we think that the number of 5,000 a year is about right for us without any diminishment of quality. There are some things we are going to have to do. We are appealing to some of the marines who are with us now to stay longer. We are sending out a letter to marines who have been out 1, 2, 3, 4 years to consider coming back until this fight is over. They are trained and they would be helpful.

We are going to have to put, we think, some additional recruiters into field in order to be able to come up with the numbers. But we feel confident that we can do that.

With regard to the waivers, sir, if you want me to address that. We have not changed our standards since before September 11. What we have seen is a mild increase in the number of waivers that have been granted—we call them moral waivers—over time. But we ask hard questions upfront and we want people to be honest with us, and if we find that they are not, then they are not granted a waiver.

As General Schoomaker indicated, we track these people through training to gauge success in attrition rates and, in fact, we have seen no increase in attrition even though our waivers have gone up mildly.

Senator MCCAIN. General Schoomaker, you spoke very strongly that you are not satisfied with the readiness of the nondeployed forces. When did you come to this conclusion that the readiness of nondeployed forces was unsatisfactory? A year ago, 2 years ago, 4 years ago, yesterday?

General SCHOOMAKER. I testified in June, as a matter of fact I believe it was June 27, before the House Armed Services Committee last year when it reached a level that I was concerned. Obviously, I have been concerned since I have been the chief about accelerating the transformation and filling the holes in the force that I have testified to many times.

As you conduct combat operations you increase combat losses, you increase the attrition and repair, the consumption, so to speak, of the force. So we are working a very complex formula here as we go forward.

Senator MCCAIN. I understand that, but it was pretty well known to many of us that we were going to be in this thing for a long time. It was very tough, that these things were going to happen. Yet somehow it does not seem that the Pentagon anticipated, at least sufficiently, because we are now at the position that you just described, that nondeployed forces are not ready.

So my curiosity is aroused as to why we did not act to prevent this situation, which has obviously serious implications.

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, sir, I can speak for the time that I have been here. We requested—you might remember, going back to

2004, we only received \$300 million in procurement in our supplemental funding to address the attrition and combat losses. There was a time the year before that when there was no appetite for any procurement funds in supplemental funding, when we knew that the attrition of the force was going to—or of equipment, the depreciation of equipment.

In 2005 we got about \$8 billion worth of procurement in the supplemental funding. In 2006 we got another \$8 billion, but you might remember that all the way up through 2006 we never received this money in time, nor to the full request. This year we received for the first time in time for the fiscal year to start the money we asked for, sufficient money, on time, and we have now committed about \$12 billion of the \$17.1 billion that we received on the 1st of October to address this problem.

Senator MCCAIN. So for several years Congress failed to meet the requests of the DOD?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I am not saying Congress failed. You know the system. The Army submits its requirements. It goes through the DOD to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), into the President's budget, and across to Congress. The record is clear and we can provide it for the record what our request was against what passed through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)—to the President's budget, and then what Congress did with it.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, the only reason why I asked, I was under the impression that Congress had fully funded the requests that came to Congress from the executive branch. So—

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, in some cases Congress added money to our request, to the President's budget.

Senator MCCAIN. So the breakdown was someplace between your budget request and what arrived at the doorstep of Congress?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, the system is clearly understood. We all know what the system is.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, it is a bit dispiriting, though, because I think that most of us on this committee would have supported whatever we thought was truly needed to prevent us from being in the situation where we are in today, which I agree with you does not affect the situation on the battlefield today, but is clearly, I think—and you have stated it I think in forthright terms—of great concern if we have a lack of readiness on nondeployed forces. I hope that it will be a subject of attention of this committee as well as the Appropriations Committee.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain is right. I believe we have at least supplied the funds requested and more so in the number of years. But if you would submit that document for the record that you just said that you would be happy to supply, as to what your request was to the OMB and then at each step of the way what happened to it over the last 4 years, it would be very helpful to us.

[The information referred to follows:]

ARMY'S BUDGET REQUEST AS SUBMITTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE (OSD) FROM FISCAL YEAR 2003–FISCAL YEAR 2008

The table below displays the Army's combined base program request and supplemental request since fiscal year 2003 in three columns: as submitted to the OSD

(Comptroller), as approved by OSD, and the Office of Management and Budget and as appropriated by Congress.

[In billions of dollars]

Total Budget	Army Request to OSD	OMB/OSD Position	Congressional Position (APPN)
Fiscal Year 2003 .....	\$135.6	\$115.6	\$115.2
Fiscal Year 2004 .....	145.6	131.2	134.2
Fiscal Year 2005 .....	168.3	155.4	159.5
Fiscal Year 2006 .....	187.7	165.9	165.7
Fiscal Year 2007 (Base and Title 10 Only) .....	160.4	160.7	159.0

This table shows the amounts requested by the Army and subsequently approved by OSD/OMB for the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental, fiscal year 2008 base budget, and fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism request.

[In billions of dollars]

	Army Request to OSD	OMB/OSD Position
Budget Request Fiscal Year 2007 Main Supplemental <sup>1</sup> .....	\$ 66.0	\$ 58.9
Fiscal Year 2008 Base <sup>2</sup> .....	130.7	130.0
Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on Terrorism Allowance <sup>3</sup> .....	105.1	92.1

<sup>1</sup>Adds \$12.2 billion for Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF), Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) not included in the Army's request to OSD but submitted to Congress by OMB/OSD.

<sup>2</sup>Includes \$7.7 billion for Grow the Army.

<sup>3</sup>Adds \$8.7 billion for ASFF, ISFF, and JIEDDO not included in the Army's request to OSD but submitted to Congress by OMB/OSD.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I have an inquiry. On our hearing notice, the footnote says there is a possibility of a closed session. I think, in view of the first responses of our witnesses, that closed session in my judgment is a needed session.

Chairman LEVIN. We hope that we can reach a closed session here today, depending on the timing. But it is an important subject we are at, and we will either—if we have a closed session we can get into the percentages which are referred to as to the lack—the shortfalls in readiness of nondeployed forces. If we cannot get to a closed session, for whatever reason today, we would then ask those questions for the classified record.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, we would be glad to send the experts over here and lay it down in detail for you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

General Schoomaker, thank you for your service.

General Schoomaker, every time this committee has asked you whether we have had sufficient funding and equipment to protect our troops in Iraq, we have been assured that we do. In November 2003 you told the committee: "This Army is committed and what we have to do is commit ourselves and make sure we are supporting our soldiers."

Three years ago you told the committee: "I am confident we are doing everything we can to move more uparmored Humvees and other armored vehicles into the theater." When I expressed frustration about the lack of armored Humvees and the need to make it a higher priority in February 2004, you said: "We are raising the production levels. I am with you 100 percent."

April 2005, the Deputy, former Marine Corps Commandant General Michael W. Hagee, testified at a Seapower Subcommittee hearing: "Marines had all the funding they needed for uparmored Humvees." Two months later General Hagee assured the committee "The force protection of our troops is absolutely priority number one."

In June 2005, when I raised the issue with General Myers, he assured us that "Safety and the force protection of our troops is absolutely the first priority."

February 2006 when I asked you again about this topic, you said: "We are going to continue to have either anticipated or over-produce, which I believe we have in body armor, or come up with other solutions to the situation we have."

According to the April 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the Army said nine times that they had enough, the Army had enough, armored vehicles, only to turn around and add more. Each time the Army paid for them with funds Congress added to purchase Army vehicles in excess of the stated requirements.

Now, I understand that your unfunded priority list for 2008 includes \$2.2 billion for MRAP vehicles, the most up-to-date protection for our troops. But you are not asking for any MRAP funding in the fiscal year 2008 budget, either in the basic budget or in the supplemental. In the Army budget, you only funded 60 vehicles and asked for 500 more vehicles in the 2007 supplemental.

The Marines have funded 805 vehicles and requested 244 more in the supplemental. You have only asked for 60 and requested 500 for Congress to provide.

Why is the Army not putting this as a higher priority?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, first of all let me go back and address—as you recall, the original requirement for uparmored Humvees was 235 vehicles. Today it is 18,000 vehicles. Every time we start closing the gap over the request that the theater makes, it moves again. So every time we have testified, we have testified to the facts as they were at that point in time. As we continue to move forward the goal keeps moving forward. So what we are trying to do is overstretch.

As to the unfunded requirements, in our original requests, those requirements that are unfunded are in the request. We are asking for 2500 MRAP vehicles in the program. We want to build MRAP as fast as we can, and of course at some point in time we want to make sure that we can transition into the joint vehicle, which is a better solution.

Senator KENNEDY. General, why is it that in the Army you only have 60 vehicles, and the Marines got 800 funded? They bought it out of their own funds. You have only put 60 in your funds and you have asked Congress in the supplemental to put 500. The Marines have put money for 800 vehicles in their own funds and requested 244 more. Then you are not requesting any MRAP funding for fiscal year 2008, either in the basic or in the supplemental.

You have unfunded for \$2 billion. But the issue is in terms of your priorities, 60 vehicles funded in the Army's budget, and you are expecting Congress in the supplemental to do the 500. The Marines, because of the urgency, have asked for 800 to be funded.

That is, we are trying to find out—we have gone over this, the uparmoring of the Humvees, over a long period of time.

I think it has been tragic that we always find out—it has by and large been Congress that has been after the increase in the uparmoring of the Humvees over a long period of time. Now we are finding out, just in terms of the point that has been gone over with General Peter Pace, USMC, and others about the shortage and about how people are not going to go out into missions because they have not gotten it, now they find out the Army has only requested 60 vehicles in here. I do not understand how this is consistent with the assurances that you are giving this committee this morning.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, that number does not track with my numbers and I would like to have—come up here and tell me what we have funded, General Speakes.

Chairman LEVIN. If you would give us what is funded and what is requested in 2007 supplemental.

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. Sir, let me address the concept. The concept right now is—

Senator KENNEDY. Just give me the numbers, please, and then we can get the concept.

General SPEAKES. Sir, absolutely. The requested 2007, \$520 million. We are in the process right now. We have submitted a re-programming request for \$70 million. That is up at the OSD's office being considered now.

In fiscal year 2008, an additional \$500 million. We also put into our unfunded requirements list \$2.2 billion. That goes and buys out about 2,500 vehicles. We are en route then to the future. We are doing it now.

Senator KENNEDY. That is unfunded?

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. So that is unfunded.

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir, it is.

General SCHOOMAKER. Not all of it.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I have the list. I do not want to take up more time, but I have the list, the DOD list, which is unfunded requirements, MRAP at \$2.2 billion. I had, my information was you funded out of your Army budget 60 vehicles and had requested in the supplemental 2007 for 500 more vehicles.

My time is up here. If you could translate that, those figures that you gave, into that.

The point that I was saying here, General, it is difficult to gather the sense of urgency that I think most have expressed about having adequate equipment over there when we have the Army, which has a major role in this surge aspect, and the Army request is only 60 vehicles, and the Marines have gone up to the extent that they have had virtually eight times the amount of the Army, and the request—I will make those figures available. If you could just answer back I would very, very much appreciate it.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, we will respond for the record because those figures I do not believe track with what we have.

[The information referred to follows:]

## MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

The current Army MRAP vehicle requirement of up to 2,500 vehicles is based on recent Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS) and an Army operational needs statement. MRAP is a Theater-unique requirement that fills a specific capability niche by providing our Warfighters with an increased force protection capability now through commercial off-the-shelf procurements. The program is currently managed as an Acquisition Category II (ACAT II) with resourcing dependent upon supplemental funding, but given the Joint quantities and cost projected for the MRAP it is likely to become an ACAT ID program of record with resourcing required in the base budget.

The requirement for MRAP was not contained in the fiscal year 2008 base budget because it came into the Department as a JUONS request from Theater to support the global war on terror. Therefore, the request for funding was submitted as a supplemental request. Current Army funding for MRAP consists of initial start-up funding of \$90 million as a cash flow from the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) program until receipt of the \$520 million requested in the fiscal year 2007 main supplemental. To support this strategy, the Army submitted reprogramming requests that total \$90 million to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Upon receipt of the \$520 million fiscal year 2007 main supplemental, the Army intends to repay the \$90 million reprogrammed from the HMMWV program, with the remainder of the \$430 million going to MRAP. Procurement of all 2,500 MRAP vehicles will require an additional \$2.249 billion, which is currently unfunded.

Senator KENNEDY. All right. Well, I will give the General just the figures from DOD that I have here. That is where we have gotten them, both from the Marine Corps and—and if those are not accurate then we would like to be corrected.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator THUNE.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schoomaker and General Conway, thanks so much for your service and for being here today.

General Schoomaker, in your testimony you had mentioned that budget reductions in fiscal year 2006 caused the Army to, “slam the brakes on expenditures when supplemental appropriations were not provided when expected.” You also mentioned lack of funding in fiscal year 2006 was avoidable. I guess the question is, how was it avoidable? Was it a planning issue or a communication issue with Congress?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, we received the main budget in 2006 at the end of December. That is one quarter after the fiscal year started. We received our first increment of supplemental funding at the same time, at the end of December. We received our second increment of supplemental funding at the end of June, June 30, which was only 90 days before the fiscal year ended.

Chairman LEVIN. June 2006?

General SCHOOMAKER. I am talking about in 2006. Last year, is what I testified to. So we received—we cash flowed ourself for the entire first quarter of 2006, which caused us to have to take extraordinary measures to slow things down.

We then had to cash flow ourself again all the way to June 30th. You might remember we had significant dialogue with the Hill about the impacts of this. We had to go through extraordinary measures of laying people off, slowing down production in depots, stopping travel, stopping all kinds of things that were crucial to us.

When I testified in June about my concerns about the non-deployed force readiness, it precipitated an effort from the Hill that

was appreciated, which gave us \$17.1 billion in reset funding at the beginning of this fiscal year, which included over \$4 billion. Actually, there was almost \$5 billion that we were denied the previous year to catch up. So the \$17.1 billion was actually a makeup from 2006 and what we anticipated we would need for 2007 to keep things going.

As a result of getting the money on time in sufficient amount, we now are up to over 25 million direct labor hours in our depots. We accelerated from 8 hour shifts, once a day, 5 days a week to now where we are averaging 2 shift 10-hour days, 6 days a week, a significant increase in our depot output for reset.

So that is what I was speaking to. It is a matter of timing and sufficiency, and this year we will suffer the same fate if we do not see the supplemental funding come in by April. We will end up having to go right back through that same cash flow kind of a problem and we will slow down this whole system. Again, I remind you that the Army request as it goes in, just like the Marine Corps and everybody else, goes through a process where different levels help shuffle these priorities about what is and certain things end up unfunded.

Senator THUNE. What advice would you pass on to General George W. Casey, Jr., USA, to ensure that it does not happen again?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, we have already had significant discussions, the last one as late as yesterday. I told him that it is absolutely essential, I mean it is just paramount, that we maintain the momentum. If we do not maintain the momentum and the synergy that we have achieved here between DOD and the Hill and get and continue to stay ahead of this problem, we are going to end up having to back up.

Now, I remind you we started this fight flat-footed as a result of the \$100 billion in underinvestment in the United States Army that occurred following the Cold War. The Army was the major bill-payer in the peace dividend. So we started with a \$56 billion deficit in equipment. The Army is only 40 percent—I am talking about Active, Guard, and Reserve—it is only 40 percent of the size of the Army at the end of the Cold War.

We are on a very aggressive program to increase the actual organizations in the Army, combat organizations, by over 30 percent. We now have permission to grow the Army in terms of personnel to man that. But at the same time where we are at war, where we have combat losses and we have accelerated depreciation of this equipment because of how hard it is being run, we still have to make up that shortfall that we started with, at the same time that it is attritional, at the same time we are trying to grow.

We cannot do it by keeping shooting behind the ducks. We have to get ahead of the program and that means adequate funding in a timely fashion to get ahead of where we have to go. We have that momentum today and I really meant what I said. I appreciate the support we have gotten out of this committee. We are on the right path. We need to continue to support General Casey and the Army as we go forward. We need to complete this. It includes things such as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and Military Construction (MILCON), which right now we are fighting. We have a \$2 bil-

lion shortfall in BRAC funding, which means we will not have barracks, training facilities, child care centers, family housing, for the units we have to grow and reposition.

So we need your help to operate in anticipation of where we are trying to go and join together in our campaign to get this thing right. We are in a dangerous period and the things that we are seeing today are going to continue.

I just finished talking to my Chinese counterpart the other day and they did not say that we are their adversary, but they made it very clear that people are going to school on what they see happening, and this asymmetric component of warfare is going to continue to be part of warfare in the future and we have to fix this force, Marine Corps, Army, Special Operations Force (SOF), the Navy and Air Force, in such a fashion that it is prepared for the 21st century.

So I am sorry to amplify this thing into a big ball here, but we have to quit dealing tactically with this problem and deal with it strategically, which means we have to look at the whole issue and we have to come together in a way that solves this issue, not chasing Humvees every time that they raise, but going and reaching out and getting ahead of this.

These people that keep saying that we are never going to do this again, I do not know where they come from. I mean, this is a peek into the future and we better get ourselves ready for it.

So I will get off my soap box, but I have probably answered more of the question than you wanted. But that is where I am coming from.

Senator THUNE. I appreciate that.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman, but I may submit a question for the record regarding National Guard funding in particular as it pertains to my State of South Dakota.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, if I could, I can tell you something right now. We have about \$46 billion in equipment that is in this budget for the National Guard and Reserves. If you take a look beyond 2013, there is an additional \$52 billion worth of requirements that we estimate right now. Of that, \$24 billion is for the National Guard and Reserves.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General SCHOOMAKER. So this budget that is submitted, although substantial, is only getting us part way by 2013. If we want to do something smart we would try to accelerate some of that stuff outside this program at some point into this program and get ahead of it.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

I have just been informed there is going to be a third vote this morning, which complicates our lives further. But we are going to continue just to try to work around it the best we can.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, General Conway, General Schoomaker.

Let me add my commendation, General Schoomaker, for your service in a very difficult situation. You have performed admirably. Thank you very much, sir.

I just want to go back and clarify something in General Speakes' comments to Senator Levin. You used the term "cross-level." What does that mean? Maybe General Speakes—

General SCHOOMAKER. Are you asking me?

Senator REED. Either one. Who is most prepared?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, in our terms what we are doing to accelerate forces into theater is having to move maneuver equipment, as I am sure the Marine Corps is doing, across units to make fully equipped units that are going forward.

Senator REED. So essentially you are taking equipment from units, principally in the United States, I presume?

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct.

Senator REED. Giving them, which further erodes your deployment situation, your readiness situation for nondeployed units?

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct. That is the dilemma.

Senator REED. Let us just focus a minute on the last brigade you have scheduled to go into Iraq. They do not have—I presume they do not have the equipment physically in their possession yet, all of it; is that correct?

General SCHOOMAKER. They have—first of all, I do not want to talk about timing. But it is down the road a ways.

Senator REED. Yes, sir, I do.

General SCHOOMAKER. The answer is that they have the equipment that is available in the continental United States and, yes, they have been accelerated and they are training with it. However, things like FRAG-5 uparmored Humvees, and some of the theater-specific equipment they will not link up with until they get into theater.

Senator REED. That equipment that they have to link up has been identified?

General SCHOOMAKER. It has been. That is what General Speakes was talking about.

Senator REED. There is not a situation where there could be a disconnect—I am talking about the last brigade now moving forward and those last units—where it is identified, but it cannot be produced or it is not available, it is not linked up? You are confident that—

General SCHOOMAKER. I believe we have the solution in hand. It is going to be some hard work. I believe we will get there, given the set of conditions we have today.

Senator REED. Let me switch to another issue which I think you are being tasked for and that is, first, the enablers—translators, civil affairs officers. Have you a full complement of translators and civil affairs officers for these new tactics?

General SCHOOMAKER. We have accelerated all of that. We are doubling our civil affairs holdings. We are growing Special Operations Command by about 14,000, which is civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPs), Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, so those things. But again, it is going to take time. I mean, this is going out through the program.

Senator REED. We understand that, sir. But you have a mission to support Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus', USA, new counterinsurgency tactics, which presumes significant translators since you are operating in small units, in the neighborhoods. Can

you guarantee us that they will have the full complement of the requested translators and civil affairs officers?

General SCHOOMAKER. I cannot guarantee that. I know we are working very hard on it.

Senator REED. Yes, sir.

General SCHOOMAKER. We are going to do the best we can.

Senator REED. I understand, and I appreciate your candor.

With respect to the supplemental, General Conway, how much did you ask for this supplemental, the Marine Corps?

General CONWAY. Sir, \$5.6 billion.

Senator REED. How much did you get?

General CONWAY. You are talking about——

Senator REED. I am talking about the fiscal year 2007 supplemental.

General CONWAY. The bridge supplemental, sir, the one that—we received all we asked for.

Senator REED. You received all you asked for?

General CONWAY. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. General Schoomaker, how much did you ask for in the bridge supplemental?

General SCHOOMAKER. We had in the—it comes in different pieces. The bridge supplemental title 9 was about \$44 billion. It is \$43.8 billion. The main supplemental request for 2007 is \$46.7 billion.

Senator REED. Do you have it all that you asked for?

General SCHOOMAKER. We received what we asked for in the bridge. The main is pending.

Senator REED. The pending, have you received everything in the pending request?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, there is an unfinanced requirements list that we were asked to submit, and some of that was in our request.

Senator REED. You made the request. Who essentially turned you down for that funding?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, I do not know. It goes through OSD to OMB and comes out in the President's budget request over here to the Hill. So the process prioritizes above us. We lay out what we think we need.

Senator REED. So you have made the case for more resources, but either the Secretary of Defense or OMB or the President has decided that they are not going to fund those requests?

General CONWAY. Sir, I do not think a decision has been made yet. We are still testifying in order to try to be able to justify it.

Senator REED. You are testifying to—I do not mean to be——

General CONWAY. We spoke yesterday, sir, with the House Armed Services Committee.

Senator REED. Well, I am talking about the request that has come over here, which comes from the executive. We have been known to increase based on your testimony. But what is coming over here seems to be less than asked, at least by the Army, and that decision was made above your level; is that correct, sir?

General SCHOOMAKER. That is the process, yes, sir.

Senator REED. I understand. I just want to make it clear because when you return here and people ask you why did you not ask for the money, you did.

General SCHOOMAKER. First of all, in defense of everybody, I do not think it is really simple why things get prioritized the way they do. People are working against certain top line caps and have to work within certain limits that are set. So I think people are trying to do the very best they can do in terms of the priorities. But the fact of the matter is it is different than what it ends up.

I just got a piece of paper. We requested \$99 billion in the supplemental and our submission now is for \$93 billion.

Senator REED. So there is a delta of about \$6 billion.

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. You mentioned prepositioned stocks, General Schoomaker. Can you elaborate on your concerns?

General SCHOOMAKER. In an unclassified form, I would rather not go into specifics. But I can tell you that the prepositioned stocks were part of the solution to accelerate the brigades and therefore it increases the risk to our strategic depth.

Senator REED. This obviously raises issues with respect to other potential contingencies. You are not as well prepared today as you were several years ago to respond to an additional contingency?

General SCHOOMAKER. It is not useful to compare to prior to this war because we were not in good shape then. But I would tell you that my concerns have increased. That is why I have talked about this. Again, the chairman's risk assessment, a classified document that has been provided over here, lays this out. I think that it would be more appropriate to discuss that at that level.

Senator REED. A final question. My time has expired. Given all you have said, this obviously is a factor in the advice that you would give to the Secretary of Defense and to the President with respect to other operations?

General SCHOOMAKER. Absolutely.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Just an historic fact. The 2006 supplemental, which came to you so late, was not included in the 2006 base budget.

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct.

Chairman LEVIN. That is the heart of the problem, and that is what we have been complaining about here. We want these supplementals in the base budgets.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Having had a little experience myself in the building, I really commend you and your staffs. These necessary changes and the challenge that you have are tough to meet and you are doing the best you can trying to work out a long-range financial plan, at the same time adjusting for what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President deem are necessary additional requirements.

So I draw your attention to the President's announced plan weeks ago in January, about the 21,500 additional forces. Since that time we have had published reports, namely the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), stating that there were considerable addi-

tional forces than the 21,500 needed for the infrastructure to support the implementation of 5 new brigades into this operation and such additional marines as come forward.

Do you have any comments on that report? In the period of time since that report was issued, which was February 1, I presume the system has worked it and now has a more accurate answer. General?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir we could give you the specifics for the record. I will give you the magnitude. Since the last time I testified, we knew that we were going to have five brigades that were so-called surging into Iraq, and of course we have worked that very carefully. In addition to that, since that time we now have an additional brigade going into Afghanistan. We have an additional some 2500 embedded trainers over and above what we had before. We now are getting requests for combat support, combat service support components to support this surge.

So you are exactly right, the five brigades is only the tip of the iceberg. There is lots below that that we have to do. We are even today getting additional requests for forces that continue to stress us in terms of what we have to do.

Senator WARNER. Well, can you give us some better estimate? I mean, one of the CBO estimates apparently was that not 21,500 additional forces; it could be as high as 48,000. Now, that seems to me to be slightly—

General SCHOOMAKER. I think that is—

Senator WARNER.—beyond unrealistic.

General SCHOOMAKER.—beyond realism.

Senator WARNER. What increment above 21,500 additional forces do you estimate?

General SCHOOMAKER. I think the planning factor we have used in the past is about 15 percent.

Senator WARNER. 15?

General SCHOOMAKER. About 15 percent for logistics to support the force. Of course, your embedded trainers, the 2,500 I talked about, are over and above that. So there is probably a factor of another 5,000 or 6,000 additional forces, and this is an estimate. We will give you the specifics.

[The information referred to follows:]

Multi-National Force-Iraq and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) have continued their analysis to determine the type and number of additional enabler capabilities required to support the combat force surge in Iraq. The Secretary of Defense has approved CENTCOM's request for five Brigade Combat Teams and one division headquarters with combat support/combat service support personnel. Any additional requests for forces from CENTCOM would have to be approved by Secretary Gates for additional personnel. The Army provides the combatant commander with the capacity and capabilities necessary to achieve stability and security in Iraq. The Army's Title 10 functions are to man, train, and equip our forces for employment as needed by the combatant commanders. The Army is committed to generating whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped to deal with whatever they will face.

General CONWAY. From the Marine Corps perspective, sir, we have no additional increase. It is a mature theater. We rely upon the Army for theater-level logistics and our numbers are what they are.

Senator WARNER. So your numbers will remain?

General CONWAY. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Now, in the course of the buildup or the planning for the buildup, the President and his staff, and I have often said, did work very hard there for about 90 days in the fall and announced it in early January. I presume that each of you—well, perhaps not you, General Conway, because you were still moving into the Commandant's office. But you, General Schoomaker, were consulted on a regular basis as to the availability of the forces to meet those surge levels of 21,500?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, we were consulted. We provided our very candid military advice on this. I do not deal in the 21,500.

Senator WARNER. Beg your pardon?

General SCHOOMAKER. The answer is yes, I was fully consulted and I was able to provide advice, as were the other chiefs. We do not tend to deal in numbers like 21,500. We deal in X number of brigades, X number of trainers, and these kinds of things.

Senator WARNER. All right.

General SCHOOMAKER. So what we talked about and the advice we provided was a variety of options and what the impact would be. I personally feel that from the President on down I had adequate opportunity to provide my absolute candid advice and I did that.

Senator WARNER. Are you able this morning, or should it be in classified session, to share that advice with us?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, our practice is that the advice we provide the President remains confidential between us and the President.

Senator WARNER. In this instance, you were responding to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

General SCHOOMAKER. I am responding to—in the case that I am talking about, I respond to the Secretary of Defense and the President as an individual chief, as a member of the Joint Chiefs, and we communicate through the chairman to them.

Senator WARNER. Well—

General SCHOOMAKER. What I am saying is that the chairman is obligated to present any dissenting opinions—

Senator WARNER. Correct.

General SCHOOMAKER.—of advice, and he did that, as did we, anything that we differed.

I will remind you, our mission now is to support the Commander in Chief. He has made a decision and we are putting our heart and soul into making sure that General Petraeus is successful in this.

Senator WARNER. I do not question that at all, General. I have some familiarity with that regarding chain, so I appreciate your statement. We have, fortunately, in Virginia the Joint Forces Command under General Lance L. Smith, USAF. You are familiar with that. Now, he actually goes out and tasks the various service chiefs to advise him about the availability and the degree of training and equipment in each of those forces.

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. Now, when he approached the Army through you, presumably, did you at that time express to him concerns about meeting the requirements?

General SCHOOMAKER. Absolutely. General Smith is the joint force provider. Under Goldwater-Nichols, his job is to—

Senator WARNER. I am familiar. I worked on Goldwater-Nichols and helped draw it up.

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. But my point is I am trying to determine the extent to which this committee of the United States Senate can be privy to your professional opinions with regard to the availability within the Army of a suitable number of units trained and in a state of readiness and its equipment to meet the requirements of this surge.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I would be glad to share with you what I told General Smith.

Senator WARNER. That is what I am talking—

General SCHOOMAKER. His component is the Army Forces Command and that is who we deal with. We laid out to him exactly what the risks are in terms of the strategic depth of the Army, exactly what the impacts are against other contingencies. He was fully appraised of what the second and third order effects are of the level at which this force is being used, to include my concerns about the lack of adequate dwell time, not just to train and equip, but time for people to recuperate, to reunite with their families, and to do things that are necessary to sustain the long fight.

Senator WARNER. Fine. Well, I had the opportunity yesterday to go into some detail personally with General Smith on this plan and therefore, Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can have a closed session and in that closed session the General can be forthcoming with regard to his response to the Joint Forces Command.

I thank the General.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Now, Senator Ben Nelson is next. Have you voted, may I ask?

Senator BEN NELSON. No, I have not.

Chairman LEVIN. Because we are in the second half now of that first vote. Is there anybody here who has voted? [No response.]

If not, Senator Nelson, it is in your hands. If someone gets back by the time you are done, hand it over to them. Otherwise, please recess the committee.

Senator BEN NELSON [presiding]. I will hurry.

General Schoomaker, the funding for the National Guard equipment is an imperative that we all understand. It is my understanding that the Guard is equally concerned about having additional funding for adequate training for the equipment, because as the equipment is replaced it is obviously replaced by improvements as new designs and new equipment becomes available.

I assume that is the case with the MRAPs as that becomes available to those, the Guard and Reserve units. Do we have adequate funding requests in the budget for that kind of training?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, the—

Senator BEN NELSON. It is a multi-year requirement, too.

General SCHOOMAKER. The Guard and Reserve comprise 55 percent of our Army. They are a significant portion of our Army, the total force. The Guard and Reserve traditionally has not been well resourced and has not been retained at a high level of readiness. We are correcting that. As I stated, in this program that we have submitted, the President's budget, out through 2013 there is in excess of \$40 billion worth of equipment. In fact, I think it is \$45,

almost \$46 billion that is in there to help rectify this situation. Now, that is a steep hill to climb because they have old equipment in many cases and they have holes in that force. Twenty percent of the equipment in theater right now is from the Reserve components. 80 percent is from the Active components.

As I said earlier, if you look beyond 2013, of the \$52 billion that we estimate it would take to complete this resourcing of this force properly, the force that we are growing, about \$24 billion of that is for Guard and Reserve. So I think by any measure, when you take a look at the commitment we have to the Guard and Reserve as part of the total Army, that this is historic in terms of the resourcing.

Senator BEN NELSON. I am very pleased with the resetting of the equipment. I think it is important to do that. But I am equally concerned about making sure that the training dollars are available as well or otherwise there will be an inadequacy and I think we understand that.

General Conway, you are listed in the consultation section of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) as one of the military officials who met with the ISG. Were you interviewed regarding the question of surging troops in Baghdad?

General CONWAY. No, sir, I was not. My involvement with the committee was as the J-3 I presented to them a number of briefs, I think three briefs in total, as they came through the DOD on their way into Iraq.

Senator BEN NELSON. As we engage with the Iraqi army and the surge, particularly as it relates to Baghdad and the sectarian violence or violence worse than a civil war, as it has been described by some, can you tell me who the enemy would be?

General CONWAY. Sir, my expertise is in the al-Anbar Province. That is where the Marines are. I would defer questions on Baghdad I think appropriately to General Schoomaker, where we have Army brigades.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

General Schoomaker, can you tell me who the enemy is, who we will be fighting in sectarian violence?

General SCHOOMAKER. I can tell you who—I would prefer to categorize it like this. There are anti-coalition forces and our purpose there is to create a security environment so that other elements, the political element, the economic element, can take its traction.

Senator BEN NELSON. I understand—

General SCHOOMAKER. I think what you are alluding to is this is an extraordinarily complex situation.

Senator BEN NELSON. Absolutely.

General SCHOOMAKER. It is one in which probably at this point now it would be better addressed to General Petraeus in terms of based on which area he is operating in and what the dynamics are in that area—

Senator BEN NELSON. Maybe what neighborhood.

General SCHOOMAKER. Excuse me?

Senator BEN NELSON. Maybe what neighborhood.

General SCHOOMAKER. Maybe what neighborhood, that is correct.

Senator BEN NELSON. Particularly as it might relate to Sadr City.

Well, given the time frame, thank you very much, and thank you, General Schoomaker, for all the courtesies and for your extraordinary service to our country.

General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you, sir.

Senator BEN NELSON. I look forward to seeing you again.

General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you, sir.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. [Recess from 10:43 a.m. to 11:17 a.m.]

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. As we realized when there was a third vote identified, that could cause some significant delay here. Without colleagues here who have not had an opportunity to ask questions, I am afraid the only logical thing to do here is to recess subject to the call of the chair.

We may have some Senators coming back in the next few minutes, but we may not. We should have an executive session. I think we are just going to have to recess at the call of the chair. I hate to do this to you, gentlemen, but I do not have any other alternative. I do not know what your schedules are. If you could in the next few minutes consult with our staff as to what your own schedules are for the next couple hours, that would be appreciated. Then I am going to try to get back here in any event in the next 15 to 20 minutes. If there is any other Senator that comes here, they could pick up the questioning.

So we are going to recess subject to the call of the chair, but if there are other Senators who come, they can put us back into session and then pick up the questioning if they have not had an opportunity. So we are going to recess and if you could consult with our staff on your own schedule we would appreciate it. [Recess from 11:17 a.m. to 11:52 a.m.]

The committee will come back to order. We have at least two Senators now that are going to want to ask questions in open session, and then we will hopefully have time to go to executive session.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schoomaker and General Conway, I want to ask you about supplemental appropriations and about the regular appropriation process. I know there has been a lot of back and forth about what the best way to fund the war costs is, whether it is through the regular appropriations process or through supplemental appropriations. Specifically what I want to direct your attention to is the BRAC funds, the Base Realignment and Closing Commission funds, \$2 billion of which were cut out of the continuing resolution or omnibus appropriation that we passed yesterday.

There were a number of us who complained mightily about that and then offered an amendment to try to reverse that change. But now I think we have been told that that money will likely be made up in a supplemental appropriation bill.

Can you explain to me, General Schoomaker, perhaps starting with you, sort of what your approach has been to how you have tried to allocate costs to the general appropriations versus supplemental appropriations? Are we sending you a consistent message or are we sending you mixed messages?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, if I could address the first part of your question, there has been a continuing difference of opinion about where the war costs ought to be, and I will tell you that I think that there is a certain part of the war costs that are very hard to predict and therefore the supplemental appropriation in some form is necessary. However, now 6 years into this we have some experience and we can predict certain aspects of it. I do agree and I think as we go into the future we are seeing certain aspects certainly of what the Army is doing pulled into the base as we go forward.

For instance, the growth of the Army is split between the base and the supplemental right now, but by 2009 the whole thing will be inside the base, as an example.

Specifically to MILCON and BRAC, we had about a \$5.8 billion requirement there between the two that are absolutely essential to being able to restation and build the force that we are talking about. Just a kind of order of magnitude, there were 42 barracks complexes in there that housed almost 10,000 soldiers, 19 daycare centers, about 30 Reserve Force facilities to replace armories that are being BRAC'ed, training ranges and things of that nature.

The MILCON, of that \$5.8 billion, all but about \$2 billion has been taken care of. We have the \$2 billion that is BRAC-related that now is a concern. The only caution I would make is as it goes into—if it goes into the supplemental it ought to be additive. What we should not do is displace something else, because you have seen our unfinanced requirements list. You know what the demand is as we surge and as we try to do what we are doing in the war. So we would hope that in rectifying the BRAC that it does not then offset something else that is essential as well.

General CONWAY. Senator, I would say substantially the same thing to you. I think that the supplementals have been helpful in terms of those unanticipated or the costs that we just cannot calculate as finely as you might like at budget time. But it also creates a level of uncertainty for some of the out year programs.

I will use manpower as an example. We contract people for 4 years. To think that we would pay for the end strength through a continuation of supplementals I think puts some of that long-range planning and so forth at risk.

The continuing resolution is really important to us. In the Marine Corps, we have denied to ourselves the importance of barracks in particular for a long time. They have just not made our top cut in terms of the priority year to year. Now we find ourselves up against the wall and we have marines living in Korean-era barracks with gang heads, and we owe them something much better.

So we have a program through about 2012 to build 105 more barracks, most of them for the operating forces. It is rather critical to us at this point that we see that program through.

Senator CORNYN. General Schoomaker, I recall over the last few years that we have had a lot of discussion back and forth about how do we access more of our active duty military and how do we transform the military we have to make it more accessible for the new kind of missions that they are being called upon. You have been at the forefront of that.

I recall the former Secretary of Defense talking about tapping a keg at the top as opposed to the bottom and saying there ought to be a better way to access the 2.5 million or so men and women in uniform, and it just does not make any sense to have 130,000 people deployed roughly in Iraq and that puts such stress and strain on our servicemembers.

Could you update us about where we are in that effort to try to make sure that, whatever the force is, we have it organized to optimal levels so they can be deployed without unnecessary stress and strain on our military and their families?

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Cornyn, I just want to note the Secretary of Defense quoted General Schoomaker about that keg story. So that is a good question as he wraps up his time here.

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, I was not going to fess up, because I am afraid I am a culprit in this deal and there is a limitation to that analogy. But to really answer your question, I think you are talking about accessing the Reserve components in a better way. In the Cold War, the Reserve components were looked at as a strategic Reserve and it was anticipated there would be a lot of indications and warning and that we would have years to bring them up. Therefore there was a lot of risk taken in the Reserve component.

Today the Reserve components comprise about 55 percent of our Army and they are now an operational force, not only for homeland security and homeland defense, but also for what we call the away game. So therefore we need to have the entire Army on a common baseline of equipage, training, and readiness, to standards, and that is what we are building towards.

We have created what is called the Army force generation model, which allows us to predict the time at which we will need these forces, both active, Guard, and Reserve, and time their training, readiness, and equipage reset based upon that model. Now, the reality is that what we have been doing in the Army as we rebalance the Army and fix the keg solution there, that, to use another analogy, we said this is kind of like building an airplane while it is in flight. So while we have been fighting this war we have been transforming the Army, we have been doing the rebalancing, restructuring of the Army, and the more and more that has been committed to the fight the shorter and shorter the dwell is on this Army force generation model of these forces.

Therefore, it has caused us to have to use active, Guard, and Reserve Forces more frequently than we would otherwise like to. Quite frankly, it has made it even more demanding as we have tried to develop the depth we need in the force.

I am sorry that—I hope this explanation is adequate. It is a very complex kind of situation. But I believe we are well on the path to correct what existed in those days. We have moved the institutional portion of the Army down to something less than 30 percent. In other words, previously we had a very large institutional piece of the Army compared to the operational force. We have grown the operational force within our own footprint, reduced our institutional thing. We have done good business practices. We have done military to civilian conversions, and we are working this very hard to make sure that what we are doing is getting the best bang for the buck as we grow this force.

Again I will tell you that the Army is about 40 percent the size it was at the end of the Cold War. We are increasing the capability of the Army by over 30 percent and we are largely doing it within our own footprint. Now that we are getting some growth with the end strength increase, that is going to help us considerably accelerate this and to build the kind of Army that we need for the future. I think we are well on the path to do that.

Senator CORNYN. Whether it is the stress and strains of multiple deployments because our Army and military force is too small—and I know we are taking steps long term to address that—or whether it is providing the facilities, the barracks or housing or daycare centers through funding, one thing I think this committee I know is certainly determined to do is to make sure to the best of our ability you get what you need in our military, particularly an All-Volunteer military, where we have to not only recruit people but also retain experienced servicemembers, that we try to—my hope is we try to avoid some of these peaks and valleys and some of the herky-jerky approach that unfortunately seems to have prevailed all too often.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, if I could have an alibi there. In the Army's case, this is not just a matter of increasing and improving the quality of life of the soldiers we have. But in the case of BRAC, the \$2 billion, we actually have to build facilities to be able to put the forces we are growing. This is not a matter of improvement. It is a matter of having the capacity to actually station forces that we are moving and building. Without that, we in fact will retard the growth of the Army.

If I could go just one step further, I presented in the past in testimony kind of an equation that said the current operational demands on our force exceed what the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategy said it was going to be, and the QDR strategy exceeded what the resourcing was. We have tried to fix the disconnect between the resource and the strategy through base appropriations and we tried to fix the delta between the strategy and the current demand on the force with supplemental appropriations.

Now, with the growth of the Army we are starting to close those and I believe we can start merging in many cases supplemental and base budget kinds of things. But of course that means we have to grow the top line of the base budget.

General CONWAY. Sir, you make a strong point on the importance of taking advantage of everybody that we do have in uniform. In the case of the Marine Corps, about 3½ weeks ago now we put out a directive that says we have to get every marine into the fight. When I travel about and ask for a show of hands, I will get a lot of people that will say two, three, and four deployments, a rare five. But I also get hands of people who say they have not been at all. So we are saying to our commanders out there, you have to get these marines there. That is why they joined. They expect to be able to defend their country, and that their Military Occupational Specialty does not match up or that they are the only guy that can do the drain plug thing does not matter, because in time those people will be competing for promotion and for opportunity against people who have been there. So we owe it to them at this point to

give them that opportunity, and also to expand our combat experience within the Marine Corps.

Senator CORNYN. At the great Marine Museum at Quantico that I just went out to see recently, I was reminded that every marine is a rifleman. So I appreciate what you are saying.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator SESSIONS.

Senator SESSIONS. Just to follow up on these BRAC questions, General Schoomaker, the money for the BRAC that was taken out by the Senate leadership, over my objection—and I had to be in the position of unfortunately voting against the CR just to let people know I disagreed with that very seriously. You had that in the baseline budget of the military?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, that is correct.

Senator SESSIONS. So we had it in the baseline, and this clearly was a part of a baseline budget, not a war cost. It was a baseline budget. So now it has been moved over to the supplemental and either one of two things are going to happen. Either they are going to keep the supplemental at the President's request and make you take other moneys from the war to do the BRAC or we are going to raise the supplemental, which will create a false impression of how much the war costs at this period of time. Is that fair to say?

General SCHOOMAKER. Under the current circumstance that we find ourselves in now with this, it is the latter I hope that occurs.

Senator SESSIONS. I understand that.

General SCHOOMAKER. I hope that the raising of the supplemental top line is what I—

Senator SESSIONS. I know, and I support that. I am going to vote for that. But it is painful because some tough decisions were made to keep it within the budget and we spent that money on social matters. The Democratic majority spent it on other matters, deliberately leaving us short, knowing that we had to have this money to complete BRAC, and that we would put it back in on the emergency supplemental. I do not think that was good.

General Schoomaker, let me first thank you for your service. You took on a difficult task. You have served exceedingly well. You brought great experience to it. The experience you brought to the Chief of Staff of the Army was that you had been the Commander of our SOF, which have proven themselves to be exceedingly valuable, particularly in this kind of conflict.

Would you reflect for us just briefly on how much we moved and increased the SOF? Those are our forces who have cultural studies, language studies, embedded forces, and are trained to do asymmetric kind of warfare activities.

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, sir, I share your pride in our Special Operating Forces, and of course the Army has a great investment there. A lot of people think that our SOF forces are outside the Army end strength. In fact, all those forces, Army forces, are inside our end strength. So when we are growing SOF now in this program by an additional 14,000, we are adding five Special Forces battalions, we are adding the equivalent of a Ranger battalion, a Special Operations aviation battalion, we are doubling civil affairs and doubling PSYOPS and providing some logistics for them, it is a significant investment that the Army has.

In fact, when I was commanding United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 46 percent of all SOF was in the Army. So we have a huge investment there and I am proud that we are continuing to support SOCOM because I agree with you. I think that the Special Operating Forces are a very, very important component of the kind of fight that we are in. But I will remind you that they cannot do it all. They are special because they do things that other forces are not organized, trained, and equipped to do—language qualification; they are very senior in terms of experience in rank; and they operate in ways that are very complementary to what general purpose forces bring to the fight.

But I think we have made just leaps and bounds and I am very proud to have been associated with them. I go back a long way. I was part of the failed Iran rescue mission. I know what it was like when we were way at the bottom of the heap and when we confused enthusiasm with capability. Through the Cohen-Nunn amendment, to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 Goldwater-Nichols Act and everything that has occurred in the growth of our SOFs, I think we have done this right, and we did it at the right time and it came together just in the nick of time for the kind of century that we now face today.

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to Afghanistan, would you briefly tell us how the SOFs, how they contributed to that effort?

General SCHOOMAKER. They have a—

Senator SESSIONS. Summarize that for us.

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. They have a major role to play in the training and equipping and they have a huge role to play in many Special Operations—

Senator SESSIONS. In the initial—

General SCHOOMAKER. In the initial days, it was a Special Operations fight. Getting in there and enabling the Northern Alliance to be able to defeat the Taliban in such short order was quite a fact. In fact, I often use young Captain Mark Nuesh, who was one of the Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) team leaders that worked and was successful at the battle of Mazar-e Sharif, where a mere 14-man team with 2,500 Afghan fighters defeated a Soviet-equipped 10,000-man force dug in in a reverse slope defense in a defile, and they did it in one night. They did it using guile and precision and communications that were successful there.

So I think that is an indicator of the kind of force multiplication role that our SOFs can play in that kind of a deal.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you for your tremendous leadership across the board. History will record you helped create the SOFs and bring them to the level they are today.

General Conway, I just want to tell you how much I admire you and appreciate the opportunity to visit you in Iraq and the leadership that you and your people showed in Fallujah, in that fierce battle that was fought there. I wanted to appreciate that and say thank you for that. We are proud to have you head the Marine Corps.

I would ask briefly, with regard to uparmored vehicles, Humvees, General Casey said that with regard to the Army, that he had issued a rule that none would be off the secure bases. Is the Marine Corps operating at that same level?

General CONWAY. Sir, it applies to us as well. Our Multi-National Force-West reports to the Multi-National Corps and those orders are all in effect, and we are doing exactly that. We are also in good shape with regard to the FRAG Kit 5s. But also, importantly for us because out west we are seeing a lot of underbody explosions, FRAG Kit 2, which is the underbody additional armor, is also there in large numbers to outfit all of our uparmored Hummers.

Senator SESSIONS. I just do not think it is fair to have mothers and fathers who may be watching this thinking that we are riding around in Iraq and not being in armored Humvees and that kind of thing. This Congress has put up money and we have produced huge numbers. I think we went from like several hundred armored Humvees to 24,000, I was told this morning. None operate off bases in Iraq today.

Also, General Schoomaker, this morning Secretary Harvey talked about these new brigades, and if you can just give me this number because my time has expired briefly, the new brigades through technology, good management, weapons systems that use fewer people to operate the weapons systems and the vehicles, you have been able to take the same number of soldiers in a brigade, but have far more infantry capability fighting force out of that. Would you share briefly how you have done that?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. If you look at the objective brigade we are talking about, the Future Combat System (FCS)-equipped brigade, that is 900 soldiers, roughly 900 soldiers smaller than the heavy brigade that it displaces. It has about 20 percent of the sensors, 60 percent less logistics associated with it, and it has twice the number of infantry and squads in that brigade. So this is a perfect example where technology is allowing us to place manpower in the places that are necessary, doubling the number of rifleman in a brigade. It also provides the best situational awareness and the best force protection that technology can provide. So that is the path that we are on and he spoke to that this morning.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. You have done that in a time of war and it has been most difficult, and thank you for your service.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Just a couple questions and then we will go to Senator Warner and back to Senator Sessions if he has additional questions, and then we will go to executive session, at least for a short time.

On this brigade, the efficiencies technologically that are going to be able to be achieved, you said 900 less soldiers in the brigade?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, that is the FCS brigade that we will start fielding in 2014.

Chairman LEVIN. Right. What is the percentage of that, does that represent? 900 fewer than what is the current approximate size?

General SCHOOMAKER. The program calls for 15 of these brigades that will displace 15 heavy brigades.

Chairman LEVIN. But how many in a brigade, how many soldiers?

General SCHOOMAKER. I am sorry. We go—that brigade is around 2800 soldiers.

Chairman LEVIN. So it would be a reduction from 2,800 roughly to 2,100?

General SCHOOMAKER. 2,800 from 3,700. It goes from 3,700 soldiers in every brigade down to about 2,800 soldiers.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

On the BRAC issue, I understand that there is a commitment on the part of the appropriators that the BRAC money will be funded in the supplemental and we expect that by April. Is that your understanding?

General SCHOOMAKER. We definitely need it no later than April.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you heard about that commitment?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, I have heard people say that we are going to be fully funded. My concern is whether it will be additive or whether it will displace other necessary things in the supplemental. That is my concern.

Chairman LEVIN. Fair enough. Fair enough. But on that issue itself, assuming that it does not displace or that it is done in a way which is acceptable, you have heard about that commitment?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. That that money will be put into the supplemental.

Is it also not your recollection that that money was in an appropriation bill?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, that was in our base request.

Chairman LEVIN. I know that. But in the 2007 appropriation bill, which never got to conference, which the Senate adopted for military construction, that \$2 billion was in the Senate version of that appropriation bill, but it did not—it was not allowed to go to conference; is that your recollection?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very quickly, gentlemen, and I will ask you to provide this for the record. As we move towards increasing the end levels of both the Army and the Marine Corps, that puts additional burdens on the medical service that is rendered. I am told that there is internally an effort to reduce currently the number of medical personnel in uniform, to be forwarded up to the Secretary of Defense.

I might ask that each of you focus on that and if you would kindly advise the committee whether you feel those additional cuts in uniformed personnel in the medical systems can be taken in view of the expectation that Congress will meet the President's request to increase end strength.

General SCHOOMAKER. You want this for the record, sir?

[The information referred to follows:]

#### MEDICAL MILITARY-TO-CIVILIAN CONVERSIONS

From fiscal years 2006–2013, the Army programmed and funded the conversion of 4,366 military billets to civilian performance in the Defense Health Program. Unlike the Navy and the Air Force, the Army is not converting positions to save money from reduced end strength, but instead is realigning the converted military positions to the operational Army to meet operational demands and man the force. The emphasis will be on converting mid-grade military needed to build operational capability more quickly. The number of future conversions will be determined based on the operational demand, the level of funding available, and the number of convertible positions identified by the DOD Manpower Mix Criteria. The Army will only

convert when we can certify that the conversions will not degrade medical readiness, decrease quality of care, increase health care costs, or decrease beneficiary access to care. The Army staff is carefully assessing how best to grow the force. It is expected that sufficient funding for additional civilians required for military-civilian conversions would offset the need for further military medical capability. At this time, the Army is still deliberating about the level of additional medical military-civilian conversions based on an ongoing assessment of Army force structure requirements.

Senator WARNER. Yes. Thank you very much.

To what extent here in open session can you address the very serious set of facts whereby a number of the helicopters that have recently been lost in combat scenarios? That loss has now been confirmed by the Department as being attributed to enemy action, basically ground to air. What steps, if any, are the two chiefs of services taking that you can tell us in open session to try and remedy that situation?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I will—what I will not discuss in open session is what we know about how they were hit. But I can tell you that—

Senator WARNER. I will raise that in the session, so we can cover that for the record.

General SCHOOMAKER. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Richard A. Cody, USA, who is the senior aviator in the Army, is returning today from an extended trip over there, and one of his missions was to get into this and to talk to every aviation brigade commander and talk to the leadership. We have had our chief of Army aviation engaged in this. We have our aviation center looking at it.

It clearly is a combination of technologies and tactics, tactics, procedures. It is the full gamut of things. We have protected our aircraft now 100 percent with the aircraft survivability equipment.

Senator WARNER. Up to this point?

General SCHOOMAKER. You might remember that before we cancelled the Comanche program we had a hell of a lot of aircraft that were not—

Senator WARNER. Yes, I do.

General SCHOOMAKER.—did not have this on it. We now have 100 percent of the aircraft that are over there, and have for quite some time, as a result of using that money to make that happen.

But there are more threats than just missile threats in the theater, and so our tactics and the way that we operate have to continually adapt. The factors of unpredictability are large. So those are the kinds of things that we need to also do.

Senator WARNER. I think you have given us the reassurance that every resource that you have at your command is now being directed to bring up solutions.

General CONWAY. Sir, I would rather talk about our specific tactics, techniques, and procedures in a closed session, but I can tell you generally speaking that the things that we have been doing we think have protected our helicopters fairly well. Now, the exception, of course, was the loss of the 46 that we now believe was shot down about 8 or 9 days ago.

In looking at what we believe to be an accurate video, we are concerned that the aircraft survivability equipment did not properly deploy on the aircraft. So our investigation is going to get after

why not. We also, like the Army, are of course going to have to continue to review our tactics, techniques, and procedures to make sure that we continue to make our aircraft safe.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

One last question, Mr. Chairman, and then I hope we can go to that closed session.

We have just been on the floor engaged in a colloquy about bringing up Iraq resolutions. I will leave to the record that situation to try and explain what our leaders were working out, a good faith attempt by both leaders. But anyway, the resolution which I have put in, S. Con. Res. 7, which has been characterized by the press and others in many different ways, but the major thrust of the Senator from Virginia in putting that in was to direct the attention to the fact that I was hopeful that the Iraqi forces, 300,000 of them that we have trained, could be utilized to a far greater degree in that operation than envisioned by the President's plan, because they understand the language, they understand the extremely complicated reasons why there is sectarian violence of Sunni and Shia and vice versa. So much for that history.

But we were assured and the President in his plan described about the parallel chains of command and the like and how the Iraqis would be on the point and our forces would basically be in a support role.

So against the background, you can understand my astonishment when I picked up the New York Times this morning. I cannot verify the authenticity of this article, but I think it is important that we discuss this to the best you have knowledge on it in open session. I read: "Thousands of American troops in armored Stryker vehicles swarmed three mostly Shiite neighborhoods in northeastern Baghdad on Wednesday, encountering little resistance during what commanders described as the first major sweep of the new security plan for the capital."

Then dropping down: "But even though an Iraqi announced the new phase of the security plan, it was clearly an American-led operation. Only 200 Iraqi police officers and soldiers were involved, commanders said, working along 2,500 Americans."

Now, I just have to tell you that that falls far short of the public representations made by the administration that this operation would be a joint one, so to speak, and that the Iraqis would take the lead, we would be basically in a support role. Can either of you provide any light on the article that is now being disseminated publicly? General?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I talked to General Casey—I can shed no light on that article. I have no knowledge about that operation. But I did spend quite a bit of time yesterday with General Casey in discussion of how things were going in Baghdad up to the time that he left on Sunday, and his representation to me was that this—that the emphasis here is on Iraqi-led operations with U.S. forces backing up, with embedded trainers inside the Iraqi forces. So that has been the way the strategy over there has been described to me. That is what I believe is being executed, and I have no further knowledge of what you have described there.

Senator WARNER. Well, I would ask that you could provide the committee with your own views as to the authenticity of this article

and the status of the balance of forces, namely Iraqi and U.S., as they move in on these operations.

General Conway, I look back at the time that I was chairman. You were always very courteous and I tried to get over every week or 2 when you were in charge of the Joint Staff to avail myself of the briefings. I know that you kept up to the time that you proudly stepped into the Commandant's role a daily analysis of the situation. Can you comment at all on this article?

General CONWAY. Sir, I cannot. It is counter to what I understood to be the plan as well, and of course our traditional plan is to put the Iraqis in the lead. It is their country and it is their military and they will be the ones that eventually secure the stabilization of the country. It is counter to articles that appeared just the day before announcing that Iraqi battalions were arriving as strong as 70 percent or more so.

So I think there is a plan to get them engaged. I do not understand the sequencing and the timing.

Senator WARNER. Well, I was led to believe that as we moved out on the phases that things would be in place to fulfill that representation, namely that it be an Iraqi-led operation and we would be in a support role. This is astonishing, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Let me join Senator Warner in his expression of dismay at that article. That runs counter to what we have been told that the surge would be, how it would be handled, and I do not know whether or not—I had to talk to Senator Webb for just a moment, but Senator Warner, did you request a report on that matter?

Senator WARNER. No, I asked each of these chiefs of their services to, after they have had an opportunity to determine the credibility of this report and perhaps other similar reports that I have seen, not as serious as this one, as to whether or not you feel this operation is proceeding as it was represented to you and to Congress.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. We will then rely on you, General, to get us that report back on behalf of the Army.

[The information referred to follows:]

#### IRAQIS LEADING OPERATIONS IN BAGHDAD

The Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the other commanders on the ground in Iraq develop the operational employment of forces. The surge of forces increases the number of brigade combat teams in Iraq over the next several months. The objective of this re-enforcement is to help Iraqi forces clear and secure Baghdad neighborhoods, thus protecting the local population while extending our partnership with the Iraqi Army to enhance training. Additional forces will also be sent to al-Anbar to disrupt and dismantle al Qaeda in that region. The Commander, CENTCOM continually assesses requirements for combat support/combat service support forces to ensure proper troop levels are maintained to support coalition goals.

Chairman LEVIN. There was a story in yesterday's papers as well which read almost precisely the same. We saw pictures of the American troops in the lead.

Senator Webb is next. He has not had an opportunity yet. He will take his turn. I am going to leave the gavel to him, and then, Senator Sessions or Senator Warner, if you have additional questions, he will then call on you and then he will recess to 222 for an executive session.

Senator Webb.

Senator WARNER. First, I would note that I am pleased that my colleague from Virginia, after just a few months in the Senate, is now acting chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Well deserved.

Senator WARNER. I am very impressed. It took me 29 years.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, let me say it is long overdue. [Laughter.]

Chairman Webb.

Senator WEBB [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To my distinguished colleague from Virginia, it only took me 15 years to follow you over to Secretary of the Navy, so I am a little behind the power curve here in terms of what it might take in terms of becoming chairman.

Gentlemen, I apologize for having had to leave the room. We have a competing hearing in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and then a lot of maneuvering has been going on on the Senate floor. I appreciate your patience this morning.

I did have a few questions I wanted to ask. One of them—and this is a limited time, so in the interest of getting us all out of here I do not expect extremely long answers to these questions. But I do want to get them into the record and I have some concerns.

The first is on force structure. I would like to commend—and by the way, Senator Warner, if I may say one other thing, General Conway was an officer candidate in the company in which I was a platoon commander back in 1970. So I can assure you that they had a very rigid experience before he put on his second lieutenant's bars.

Senator WARNER. So they passed the Webb test, right?

Senator WEBB. Excuse me?

Senator WARNER. They passed the Webb test.

Senator WEBB. They passed the Quigley special test actually at that time.

But I have long admired General Conway's career and he has my utmost congratulations on the assignment that he has right now.

General Conway did mention early on, and I am glad that you did, the strain on the force structure in the Marine Corps and your desire to get back to a one to two deployment cycle for the units that are going over. I know that, General Schoomaker, you have mentioned these issues as well. The question I have, and I would like to get a clarification from both of you on this, on the one hand in your statement here, General Conway, you mention that you are emphasizing that the underlying requirement for your end strength increase is separate from the plus-up that is now being debated. At the same time—and I asked this question to the Secretary of Defense when he was before here—the whole political environment in terms of how our troops are being committed to Iraq is under debate right now and it is conceivable that there would be a dramatic drawdown in the force structure as you are ramping up, in the force structure committed to Iraq, as you are ramping up your end strengths here.

The Secretary of Defense when I asked him this question indicated to me that there are what he called off-ramps in the budget process itself, taking into consideration that if the force structure

were to be drawn down in Iraq there might be different estimates in terms of what the end strength might be.

I would ask both of you whether a considerable drawdown in the force structure committed in Iraq would have an impact on the end strengths that you are asking for? Would you be looking to put the funding for this into other programs or would you still be asking for the same end strengths that are in your plan?

General CONWAY. Sir, I will start and say that I think from a realistic point of view we have to accept that as a possibility. The Marine Corps request was built on this concept of a certain committed force and trying to get that force then to a 1:2 dwell. If that requirement comes down, dwell is made better and we are facilitated some.

But I would asterisk it by saying as well that I believe that we are a Nation at war. I think that Afghanistan and Iraq represent the first battles of this long war and I think, like in any war, you do not know what is on the horizon. You do not know what is going to follow. So if asked for my military advice on whether or not we should look at off-ramping or stopping something short of 202,000 marines, at this point I would recommend we not do that until such time as we think that this war against Islamic extremists is over.

Senator WEBB. General Schoomaker?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, if I were still here I would strongly advise against not completing the plan to build the forces, the ground forces that are required. I think that the Army is too small for the century that we are in. I believe the plan we have is the proper plan and the proper slope to do it. So my advice would be that we complete the plan and we sustain this force. It is my opinion the Nation can afford it and it is necessary in this century.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

I would like to ask a question about this notion of enlistment waivers as you are building up your force. I was present at an earlier exchange and I do not know if this came up again while I was gone. But both of you mentioned that you do not see material differences in terms of attrition through training programs, et cetera, with people who have been granted the waivers. I am wondering if there has been any distinction with respect to the type of waivers that have been granted, for instance high school graduation waivers as opposed to moral and age waivers, or is this a general experience?

General CONWAY. Once again, sir, I will start. The answer, at least in the case of the Marine Corps, is that—no. In terms of high school graduate requirements, in terms of category-4 (CAT 094) levels of authority, there have been no changes. The DOD standard is 90 percent high school graduates. The Marine Corps standard is 95 percent. We have been recruiting 96 percent. The DOD standard for CAT-4 is 4 percent. We recruit 1 percent.

The waivers that we have been granting are against that basically one-third of the American population that can qualify for military service and they have been what we call moral waivers, where if a young man or woman has some turpitude we make an assessment on it. We ask hard questions upfront. We do do the drug testing and that type of thing. But certainly we base the waivers based

upon our assessment of the individual and the severity of what has occurred.

So again to clarify, those waivers have been on a slight increase since 2002, but we have not found that our boot camp attrition or our non-end of active service attrition have either one gone up as a result of that.

Senator WEBB. So you are talking purely about the moral waiver?

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, exactly.

Senator WEBB. What about age waivers? Are you—

General CONWAY. No, sir, we do not. They have not exceeded what we would traditionally bring in.

Senator WEBB. General Schoomaker?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, first of all to put it in perspective. In 1979 we had 50 percent CAT-4s accessed into the force. In 1980 we had 56 percent CAT-4s accessed into the force. Today we have less than 4 percent CAT-4s accessed into the force.

Senator WEBB. Well, let me ask you a question about that before you go any further, because I am an old manpower guy. My recollection—I was working on the Hill at the time—is that they changed the definition of CAT-4 in 1979 and 1980, in that time period, where there are a lot of people who are now CAT-3Bs who would have been CAT-4s back in 1979 or 1980.

General SCHOOMAKER. I am not aware of that. I do not know.

Senator WEBB. Do you want to get somebody to verify that?

General SCHOOMAKER. We certainly could, and we will provide it to you for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

#### MENTAL CATEGORY IV CATEGORIZATION

The definition of Mental Category IV (CAT IV or CAT 4) has not changed. Category IV remains the mental category assigned to individuals scoring in the 10th through 30th percentile of the U.S. population on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and is the lowest acceptable category for military service.

From June 1976 to June 1980, the AFQT used by the Services was “misnormed” or imperfectly calibrated and resulted in inflated scores at the lower ability levels. Thus, the Armed Forces inadvertently enlisted considerably more persons belonging in CAT IV than intended. When properly normed, the test scores indicated 46 percent of Army recruits in fiscal year 1979 and 52 percent in fiscal year 1980 belonged in CAT IV (DOD totals for the same years were 30 and 33 percent, respectively).

General SCHOOMAKER. But nevertheless, in terms of the magnitude, if they changed it then, we were still in double digits all the way through the middle of the 1980s. So the quality of this force is as high as I have ever seen in the almost 38 years that I have been associated with the Army in uniform and out.

In terms of other waivers, it is still a very—we are talking about 1 percent of the force. I remind you that we recruited 175,500 soldiers last year, the best year we had in a long time. These waivers, just like in the Marine Corps, receive a great deal of scrutiny, and we watch the attrition in the training base as well as the units and we are seeing no difference between this.

In terms of age, we allowed some soldiers to come in over 40 years of age because they want to. But I believe the figures are correct. I think the magnitude of this is something like 700 soldiers. This is not a large number of people. They turned out to be very fit, very motivated, and very committed. In fact, we have had some

of these over 40 year olds that have actually been the honor graduates in their initial entry training. So this is in my view kind of a canard, that this is a problem.

I am very, very satisfied with the way that we are doing what we are doing. I think it does bear a lot of watching. We do not want to return to the days where we see indiscipline and the difficulties that we experienced in our early years.

Senator WEBB. That is just to clarify here. In the interest of time, because I think people are wanting to close the hearing down, that is not really my angle on this. I said I am an old manpower guy. I am also, as General Conway will remember, an old trainer. I personally have never been that concerned about people who are non-high school graduates coming into the military. If there are statistics that show that these people are the ones—I know you moved now to where this General Education Degree completion, but you really basically have a similar product.

Those are people who—many of those—if you give me a high mental category high school dropout who is enthused about what they are doing, A, they become very good soldiers and marines and, B, they become very good citizens. I have a number of close friends who are examples of that. Carlton Sherwood, a long-time friend of mine, was a high school dropout who became a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter, a three Purple Heart marine. Walter Anderson, who is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Parade Enterprises, was a high school dropout who went into the Marine Corps and became valedictorian of his college class when he finished.

The argument that was used in order to keep these people out of the system was that since they failed to finish high school they probably were going to fail to finish an enlistment or training. But if your attrition figures do not show that—a high mental category high school dropout is potentially a very good soldier or marine.

General SCHOOMAKER. Senator, I think, if I could, to make your point. The Secretary of the Army testified the other day that we surveyed the—we have the best noncommissioned officer corps I can ever remember. He conducted a survey of the serving sergeant majors in the Army today. Thirteen percent of them reportedly entered the Army as CAT-4s.

The Army and the Marine Corps build great citizens, and part of what we contribute is building young people. They are exactly as you described. They are people properly motivated, properly led, put in the proper environment, that in fact we are turning out great citizens for America, and I think that we are on the right path.

Senator WEBB. I agree.

The Senator from Alabama, do you have any further questions?

Senator SESSIONS. Briefly. Major General Walter Wojdakowski, USA, at Fort Benning was in my office yesterday and I asked him, could he tell the difference in the training level and is he worried about it. He said not any whatsoever. He was very firm on that.

I think Senator Webb is raising a good point. I think if you choose carefully those who may meet—not meet some standards, then the military benefits and the whole Nation benefits, because I do think life in the military turns out to be a blessing for many, many young people.

General Conway, when Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and I were in al-Anbar in August of last year things were not going well. The marines are primarily in that tough, tough area. The marines briefed us and there was some real concern I think we both felt. I have heard since there has been some progress. Could you briefly tell us what changes, if any, have occurred since August?

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. The sergeant major and I took a trip over Christmas to go out to see the troops.

Senator SESSIONS. I believe it was October that—Senator Warner corrected me—when we were there.

General CONWAY. You may remember, sir, Al-Qa'im at one point was the wild, wild west out on the Syrian border, and we put some great Marine battalions through there and I think they have paid for success through blood, sweat, and tears. But today I would argue it is probably the model for the rest of Iraq, because today the Sunni tribes out there have allied with the coalition forces. They have worked against the al Qaeda of Iraq (AQI). They have shut down, not entirely but significantly, the rat lines down through that Euphrates River Valley. There is a marketplace that goes every other day and there are 8 to 10,000 citizens there who mass without fear of being blown away because of the local security provided by Sunni tribesmen, police, and soldiers.

I was surprised to find in Ramadi the essence of the same thing starting to take root. There is a great young Army brigade commander there who has a Marine battalion working for him. He reports to the Marine Expeditionary Force Commander forward out in Fallujah. But he showed us a chart of Ramadi about 3 months ago. This was again over Christmas time. Of the 16 tribes in and around Ramadi, 12 were allied essentially against the coalition forces at that point. They were red or amber on the stoplight chart. Today it is just the opposite. Those tribes have finally had it up to here with the AQI because of indiscriminate killing of their sons and daughters, and they came to Colonel McFarland and Colonel Journey, the battalion commander, and said: "If you will support us, we are going to work against these people and get them out of our culture." That is exactly what has been taking place ever since.

Today those same 16 tribes show about 12 amber green and the others coming over. So I think that it is a real success story. We have not fully turned the corner yet. Ramadi is still an armpit and will be that for some time. But it is dramatically different from what it was and it is exactly what we were trying to do from the very beginning in the al-Anbar.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that is good to hear, because I left trouble, I got to tell you. I was uneasy. I have heard that. That is a good statement. I guess you should not bet against the United States military when they set their—

General CONWAY. We just need time, sir.

Senator SESSIONS.—minds to a tough challenge. It also points out that, even though we have had some bad news in Baghdad and other places, that things can change, because that is just in a matter of 2 or 3 or 4 months that this change has occurred there.

I would just, on the supplemental and the \$2 billion that came out of BRAC, we really have to replace that. That cannot be done any other way. It should not be taken from the military. It was in

the bill when we voted on it last year. It was taken out and the money was spent on social programs and other things, and now we have to get it back in.

I think, General Schoomaker, I will be prepared to support, even though I am a budget believer, that we will put it on top and not take it from your other resources.

General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Senator WEBB. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Proceed to room 222?

Senator WEBB. Yes. The committee is adjourned and we will resume in executive session in room 222.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

##### HELMET UPGRADE PAD SYSTEMS

1. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, I and the members of this committee are strong proponents of ensuring that our troops have the best equipment possible, especially personal protective gear. General Conway, in your statement, you indicated that the Marine Corps has implemented a new helmet pad system to decrease the impact from a blast or blow to the head. A charity organization, Operation-Helmet.org, has been providing helmet upgrade pad systems to our marines for a couple of years. I believe it was anticipated that your new system would put them out of business. Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case. Their Web site indicates that the feedback they are getting from the troops on the new Marine pad systems and the ones newly purchased by the Army are "very hard, do not allow the helmet to adjust to their heads, resulting in headaches and discomfort." Operation-Helmet.org claims they have been supplying a brand of pads called Oregon Aero pads because of their "excellent track record protecting from blast forces as well as 'wearability'." I am concerned that the comfort issue could reduce the effectiveness of new helmet gear, and could cause our troops to remove their helmets periodically to relieve their discomfort, potentially exposing them to danger. Worse still, they may take steps to improve comfort at the expense of safety. Has the Marine Corps and/or the Army evaluated the new pad system being provided against the Oregon Aero pads or against any other competitive manufacturers? If so, what was the results of the comparison and the basis for choosing the pads currently being provided? If not, on what basis for selection of the current pad system being provided to the troops?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army evaluates and qualifies the advanced combat helmet (ACH) impact pad system to the performance requirements in the ACH purchase description. The Army does not compare one manufacturer's impact pads to those of other manufacturers. Impact pads either meet the ACH performance specification, or they do not. All ACH impact pad sets provide comfort and wearability to the user. The Army has evaluated the impact pads in the Oregon Aero Ballistic Liner and Suspension System kit provided to soldiers and marines by the charity "Operation Helmet" against the ACH performance specification. These pads do not meet the ACH requirement for blunt impact protection. Complaints regarding headaches and discomfort have been traced to improper fit of the ACH—specifically, that the impact pad arrangement, thickness and/or shell size combination is too small. Soldiers and marines experiencing discomfort should select the next smaller size impact pad set and/or the next larger helmet shell size in order to obtain a comfortable, correctly fitting helmet. The Army has distributed graphic training aides developed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command which describe procedures to follow to properly fit the ACH to avoid discomfort and enhance performance. The Army has qualified four manufacturer's impact pad sets for production. These four impact pad sets were qualified because they demonstrated through testing that they met the performance requirement for cushioning and blunt impact protection in the ACH purchase description.

General CONWAY. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your correspondence regarding helmet pads for our young men and women in uniform. I share your strong commitment that our marines and soldiers should be equipped with the best force protection equipment available.

Let me assure you that the Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to providing the best helmet protection possible. The lightweight helmet (LWH) and the ACH were selected as superior solutions to meet the needs and requirements of our warfighters. However, no single helmet can provide complete protection against all major sources of head injury. Head injury on the battlefield can be divided into three main groupings: ballistic, blunt force impact and blast. Although the LWH with its sling suspension system performed extremely well in ballistic testing, the areas of blunt force and blast effects were of growing concern.

To that end, the Marine Corps commissioned studies to better determine the efficacy of both the sling and padded suspension systems. Additionally, the DOD participated in the congressionally directed, independent, ballistic and nonballistic tests of the Marine Corps LWH and the Army ACH through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). After receiving the study results on the performance of both the pad and sling helmet suspension systems, the Marine Corps concluded that pad suspension systems provided improved protection against blunt force trauma. Because there are a wide variety of pad suspension systems available, the Marine Corps also commissioned the U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory (USAARL) to conduct tests on various pad suspension systems. The results of the USAARL testing indicated that the pad suspension system, procured by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), provided marines the best protection available.

The current Marine Corps policy is that padded suspension systems will be installed in every LWH and only the DLA procured pad suspension system is authorized. Pads are available through the normal military supply system for all helmets that were previously outfitted with the sling suspension system.

#### INCREASE IN MORAL WAIVERS FOR PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS

2. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, a number of media outlets have reported recently on the increase in the number of new recruits needing moral waivers having criminal records. Many of these waivers are for felonies, and serious misdemeanors. I know that DOD officials have stated their support for the waiver program because it is a way to admit young people who may have made a mistake in the past, but have overcome their past behavior. As always, we must keep the safety of our troops in mind. You have both indicated in your testimony that the Army and the Marine Corps have monitored the performance of individuals with waivers through the basic training period. My question deals with whether you have studied their performance over a longer term. Has either the Army or the Marine Corps studied the long-term results of the program after these young people have been accepted into the military?

General SCHOOMAKER. There have been no recent studies conducted to assess the long-term performance of soldiers granted waivers for felony offenses. The Army evaluates cohort attrition out to 36 months of time in service. A review of the attrition data from the most recent cohort completing 36 months of time in service (fiscal year 2003 accessions cohort) reveals no significant difference between soldiers granted felony waivers and the rest of the cohort. In fact, the attrition rate for soldiers without felony waivers in the fiscal year 2003 accession cohort was 36.5 percent, while those with a felony waiver attrited at a rate of 34.4 percent.

General CONWAY. Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Manpower Plans and Policies (Enlisted Plans) and The Center for Naval Analysis continually look at the performance of marines entering the Corps on legal waivers to ensure that we are applying the proper criteria in our waiver process, and that we are not achieving unacceptable rates of recruit or first-term attrition in this group. Our most current review of short-range fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005 Accessions show no noticeable trends in either recruit or non-EAS attrition for marines with moral waivers. Likewise a look at the fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 1996 cohorts 10-year survival rates we found that Marine recruits with enlistment waivers have 10-year survival rates that are within a percentage point of those for all recruits and within a couple of percentage points of those recruits without waivers.

3. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, for instance, how have these recruits receiving waivers performed in combat compared to the overall population in the Army and the Marine Corps?

General SCHOOMAKER. There have been no studies to determine the performance of soldiers that enlisted with moral waiver in comparison the overall population in the Army. However, records of the 419 soldiers that enlisted in fiscal year 2003 with a felony waiver show that 143 have deployed in support of the global war on ter-

rorism; 93 received the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal; 71 received the Iraqi Campaign Medal; 34 received the Combat Action Badge; 15 received the Afghanistan Campaign Medal; 7 received the Purple Heart; 1 received the Bronze Star; 9 received the NATO Medal; 12 received the Unit Valorous Award; 2 have received the Humanitarian Service Medal; 114 received the Army Commendation Medal; 199 received the Army Achievement Medal; and 29 have received the Non-commissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon.

General CONWAY. Although, the Marine Corps has not measured the performance of marines with waivers in combat to the overall population, we have measured the percentage of marines with waivers meritoriously promoted to grade.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF MARINES WHO ACCESSED WITH LEGAL WAIVERS RECEIVING MERITORIOUS PROMOTIONS: FISCAL YEAR 1998 TO FISCAL YEAR 2005 ACCESSIONS

[Percentage meritoriously promoted to grade]

	Lance Corporal (E3)	Corporal (E4)	Sergeant (E5)	Staff Sergeant (E6)
All .....	9.4	9.2	3.6	9.7
Any Waiver .....	9.5	9.2	3.6	9.8
Legal Waiver .....	10.7	9.8	3.6	8.3
Felony .....	12.0	9.2	3.5	8.5
Serious misdemeanor .....	10.2	10.0	3.5	6.8
Minor misdemeanor .....	10.9	9.5	3.9	8.6

a. The high percentage of meritorious promotions to staff sergeant is due to the accession sample beginning in fiscal year 1998.

4. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what percentage of those with waivers have been discharged due to conduct problems, and how does that compare to the overall population in the Army and the Marine Corps?

General SCHOOMAKER. An analysis was done using fiscal year 2003 cohort to determine the attrition rate of the soldiers that enlisted with felony waivers versus the overall fiscal year 2003 accession cohort. Fiscal year 2003 cohort was used to provide a full 36 month analysis. The fiscal year 2003 overall accession cohort attrition was 36 percent versus 34.4 percent of the soldiers with felony waivers. Of those, 18.3 percent of overall fiscal year 2003 accession cohorts were discharged for adverse reasons in comparison to 17.7 percent admitted with felony waivers.

General CONWAY. Comparing all marines accessed in fiscal year 2004, the average separation rate for marines with legal waivers was 7.2 percent as compared to 6.2 percent for marines with any waiver. The average misconduct separation rate for all marines was 4.6 percent.

5. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, looking back, the waiver program has been used for a long time. What percentage of those recruits with waivers have gone on to have long careers in the military, for instance more than 10 years, and how does that compare with the overall population in the Services?

General SCHOOMAKER. A review of the fiscal year 1996 data on non-prior service (NPS) soldiers that were granted a moral waiver shows that 14.7 percent (319 out of 2149) are still serving in comparison to 16.6 percent (11,330 out of 68,310) of the overall fiscal year 1996 NPS accessions cohort without a moral waiver.

General CONWAY. To answer this question, we had to go back to examine data of marines recruited in the fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1996 timeframe. When comparing recruits with waivers to those without waivers the performance is consistent across each fiscal year and the recruits with waivers are within 1 to 2 percentage points of the recruits without waivers and 1 percentage point of all recruits. Again, we believe that our waiver policy is producing the results that support the needs of the Marine Corps and maintaining quality.

#### LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT OF IRAQI TROOPS

6. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, Secretary Gates told this committee in January that the arrival of the Iraqi brigades in Baghdad by mid-February would be an important litmus test of whether the Iraqi government was serious about securing its capital city. General Dempsey was recently quoted in the United Press International as saying that three brigades had shown

up in Baghdad with between 70 percent and 75 percent of their soldiers, a Kurdish unit from Sulaimaniyah and Kirkuk had arrived with only 56 percent of its expected troops, and that other inbound units from the Kurdish north were expected to arrive with 70 percent of their troops or more. However, last week, the New York Times reported that "Thousands of U.S. troops in armored Stryker vehicles swarmed three mostly Shiite neighborhoods of northeastern Baghdad on Wednesday, encountering little resistance during what commanders described as the first major sweep of the new security plan for the capital. The push into the neighborhoods of Shaab, Bayda, and Ur, on the northern edge of Sadr City, came a day after Lieutenant General Aboud Qanbar, a top Iraqi military leader, claimed broad powers to search, detain, and move residents from their homes. But even though an Iraqi announced the new phase of the security plan, it was clearly a U.S.-led operation [emphasis added]: Only 200 Iraqi police and soldiers were involved, commanders said, working alongside about 2,500 Americans." Our success in establishing and maintaining security in Baghdad and Al Anbar province during the surge relies on the operation having an Iraqi face to it. For it to work, the Iraqis must take the lead in the security crackdown, not the United States. As you well know, we have not provided General Petraeus with sufficient resources to sweep and hold these neighborhoods without significant help. If General Dempsey is correct, and the Iraqi brigades arrived on schedule, why were they not present in significantly larger numbers during this first action in the security crackdown?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I appreciate your questions; however, they would be more appropriately addressed by the combatant commander in Iraq. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Army, I do not have command or control of Army units that are assigned to Central Command.

General CONWAY. Senator, as per title 10, U.S.C. and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Navy, I do not have command or control of Marine units that are assigned to Central Command. I believe that the Central Command Commander can best address your question.

7. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, if the Iraqis were not ready, why was the operation not delayed until they were ready?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I appreciate your questions; however, they would be more appropriately addressed by the combatant commander in Iraq. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Army, I do not have command or control of Army units that are assigned to Central Command.

General CONWAY. Senator, as per title 10, U.S.C. and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Navy, I do not have command or control of Marine units that are assigned to Central Command. I believe that the Central Command Commander can best address your question.

8. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, how long will our troops maintain the new operational tempo without much more support from the Iraqis?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I appreciate your questions; however, they would be more appropriately addressed by the combatant commander in Iraq. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Army, I do not have command or control of Army units that are assigned to Central Command.

General CONWAY. Senator, as per title 10, U.S.C., and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Navy, I do not have command or control of Marine units that are assigned to Central Command. I believe that the Central Command Commander can best address your question.

9. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, for the security crackdown to have credibility, the Iraqis must show that they are treating all factions equally. How does the U.S. forces cracking down on a Shia neighborhood with minimal help from the government provide the Sunnis with an assurance that the government is being fair and impartial?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I appreciate your questions; however, they would be more appropriately addressed by the combatant commander in Iraq. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Army, I do not have command or control of Army units that are assigned to Central Command.

General CONWAY. Senator, as per title 10, U.S.C. and the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Navy, I do not have command or control of Marine units that are assigned to Central Command.

#### ADDITIONAL BUDGET INFORMATION

10. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, during the hearing, Senator Levin requested that you provide additional budget information for the last 4 years showing what the Army and the Marine Corps requested in their budget submissions. Please provide a copy of your response to his request for the record.

General SCHOOMAKER. The table below displays the Army's combined base program request and supplemental request since fiscal year 2003 in three columns: as submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), as approved by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Office of Management and Budget and as appropriated by Congress.

[In billions of dollars]

Total Budget	Army Request to OSD	Office of Management and Budget (OMB)/OSD Position	Congressional Approval (APPN)
Fiscal Year 2003 .....	135.6	115.6	115.2
Fiscal Year 2004 .....	145.6	131.2	134.2
Fiscal Year 2005 .....	168.3	155.4	159.5
Fiscal Year 2006 .....	187.7	165.9	165.7
Fiscal Year 2007 (Base and title IX only) .....	160.4	160.7	159.0

This table shows the amounts requested by the Army and subsequently approved by OSD/OMB for the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental, fiscal year 2008 base budget, and fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism request.

[In billions of dollars]

Budget Request	Army Request to OSD	OMB/OSD Position
Fiscal Year 2007 Main Supplemental <sup>1</sup> .....	66.0	58.9
Fiscal Year 2008 Base <sup>2</sup> .....	130.7	130.0
Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on Terrorism Allowance <sup>3</sup> .....	105.1	92.1

<sup>1</sup>Adds \$12.2 billion for Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF), Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) not included in the Army's request to OSD but submitted to Congress by OMB/OSD.

<sup>2</sup>Includes \$7.7 billion for Grow the Army

<sup>3</sup>Adds \$8.7 billion for ASFF, ISFF, and JIEDDO not included in the Army's request to OSD but submitted to Congress by OMB/OSD.

General CONWAY.

*All \$ in Millions*

<b>OMMC</b>	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>	<b>3,406.7</b>
REDUCTIONS:		
APECS		-3.0
Modular General Purpose Tent System		-1.8
Hydration on the Move System Basic/Chem/Bio		-1.0
Marine Corps US Made Bayonets		-3.0
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force		-1.4
Mountain/Cold Weather Clothing & Equipment Program		-1.4
Lightweight Maintenance Enclosure		-1.0
ONW/OSW/ODS ConOps		-0.5
Unjustified Growth in Training Support		-3.0
Unobligated Balances		-5.7
<b>OMMCR</b>	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>	<b>173.9</b>
<b>PMC</b>	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>	<b>1,070.9</b>
REDUCTIONS:		
MAGTF CSSE & SE - FY04 TFAS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT		-1.3
Predator (SRAW) - Operational Tests Failures		-30.5

Multiple - Sec. 8126: Efficiencies/Revised Econ. Assumptions	-8.7
	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>
<b>PANMC</b>	<b>232.4</b>
REDUCTIONS:	
Multiple Sec. 8126: Efficiencies/Revised Econ. Assumptions	-1.8
	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>
<b>RDT&amp;E</b>	<b>713.8</b>
REDUCTIONS:	
Sec. 8029: FFRDC Reduction	-7
Sec. 8126: Efficiencies/Revised Econ. Assumptions	-6.6
Section 8094: Management Improvements	-2.1
SPAWAR Service Cost Center Adjustments	-0.06
	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>
<b>MPMC</b>	<b>8,971.9</b>
REDUCTIONS:	
Selective Reenlistment Bonus	-1.8
ONW/OSW /Conops	-0.3
Unobligated Balances	-8.0
	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>
<b>RPMC</b>	<b>571.5</b>
REDUCTIONS:	
Congressional Reduction - Unobligated Balance	-2.0
Congressional Reduction - Reserve Cost Avoidance	-14.0

11. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker and General Conway, in addition, please highlight the items that were removed from your budget after you submitted your request.

General SCHOOMAKER. Prior to submitting the Army Budget Estimate to the OSD (Comptroller) in August, the Army began discussions with OSD and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Staff (OJCS) to examine the ability of the Army to meet its missions within the fiscal guidance provided. We established teams that included OJCS and OSD personnel to review and determine the cost to execute the Army's critical mission requirements. The result was an increase in the Army's fiscal guidance. Although the Army was not able to budget for 100 percent of the requirements, I am satisfied that we received a fair consideration of our requirements. After assessing the Army's fiscal year 2008 President's budget request and the fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism request, I submitted to Representative Hunter on February 9, 2007, a list of unfunded requirements to which the Army would apply any additional resources. I have enclosed that list for your information.

DESCRIPTION	FY 07 Unfunded Requirements	APPN	TOTAL (\$M)
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE		APPROX	2,000.00
	FY 08 Unfunded Requirements		
MRAP (GSTAMIDS)**	OPA		2,249
ASE	APA		207.4
PAC-3 PURE FLEET	MIPA		452.2
JAVELIN	MIPA		187.2
COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS	OPA		102.4
FMTV	OPA		1,845.5
HEMTT	OPA		324.2
LINE HAUL	OPA		30.2
PLS	OPA		225.8
COUNTER-IED SYSTEMS	OPA		152.9
REF SLDR SUPPORT	OPA		3.2
LLDR-FIRE-SUPPORT OPTICS	OPA		10.6
TOCS/SICPS	OPA		62.3
SOLDIER ENHANCEMENT PRG	OPA		18.8
FBCB2	OPA		141.5
LOGISTICS NETWORK COMMS	OPA		56.6
LOG AUTO SYSTEMS	OPA		522.6
NIGHT VISION	OPA		33
FIREFINDER MOD-IN-SERVICE	OPA		2.5
COTS TACTICAL RADIOS	OPA		49.6
FRGN LANG TRNSLTN SYSTEMS	OPA		13.3
ARMY KEY MANAGEMENT SYS	OPA		24
INFO SYS SCTY COMSEC	OPA		25.9
LTV HIGH MOB TRLR	OPA		16.9
NAVSTAR GPS	OPA		5.9
MC4	OPA		43.5
SCAMP/SMART-T	OPA		2
TACTICAL ELEC PWR	OPA		19.9
TMDE	OPA		116.4
WATER PURIFICATION SYS	OPA		6.5
ARTY ACCURACY EQUIP	OPA		2.8
TACTICAL BRIDGING	OPA		13
MAINT EQUIP	OPA		64.9
EOD EQUIP	OPA		25
FIELD HYGIENE	OPA		12.3
CARGO AIRDROP	OPA		22.4
CBRN SOLDIER PROTECTION	OPA		69.2
CONSTRUCTION EQUIP	OPA		4.7
AIR/MSL DEF C2 SYS	OPA		90.7
AMMO PRODUCTION BASE	PAA		190.5
M240 MG	WTCV		19.4
SAW	WTCV		1.7
STRYKER	WTCV		775.1
TOWED HOWITZER (M119)	WTCV		19.8
HERCULES RECAP	WTCV		24.9
Sub-total:			8288.2
Total:			10288.2

\*\* Completes buy of 2,500 MRAP out of a potential requirement of 17,770

General CONWAY.

*All \$ in Millions*

<b>OMMC</b>	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>	<b>3,406.7</b>
REDUCTIONS:		
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	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>	
<b>PANMC</b>		<b>232.4</b>
REDUCTIONS:		
Multiple Sec. 8126: Efficiencies/Revised Econ. Assumptions		-1.8
	<b>2004 Pres Bud Request</b>	
<b>RDT&amp;E</b>		<b>713.8</b>
REDUCTIONS:		
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Congressional Reduction - Reserve Cost Avoidance		-14.0

#### MEDICAL TREATMENT OF WOUNDED TROOPS RETURNING FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

12. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker, on February 18, there was an article in the Washington Post titled, "Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration At Army's Top Medical Facility." This article detailed significant problems in providing proper treatment to our seriously wounded troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. This article troubles me greatly. Under no circumstances, in my opinion, is there any excuse for providing our wounded and injured troops returning from Iraq or Afghanistan with substandard or insufficient care after they have sacrificed so much for our country. This is a moral obligation we owe our troops and their families. I am also disturbed that Congress has to learn about these problems through the press. It is imperative that our military leaders communicate these problems early, so that Congress can take action to provide whatever resources are needed to minimize or eliminate them. The Washington Post article indicates that efforts to fix the problems are underway. However, with the surge in Iraq, and the expected Taliban offensive in the Spring in Afghanistan, the potential exists for a surge in the numbers of wounded returning to the United States for treatment. What steps has the Army taken to ensure that they have sufficient capacity of trained medical personnel, as well as appropriate levels of other medical resources including hospital space and beds, available to support any increase in the numbers of wounded reporting to Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) or any other Army medical facility for treatment?

General SCHOOMAKER. The problems at WRAMC reflect poor maintenance of barracks used to house soldiers receiving medical care as outpatients and an outdated administrative management of soldiers in the Physical Disability Evaluation Sys-

tem. The quality of the medical care at WRAMC and across all of the Army's hospitals and clinics remains second to none. We have taken steps to immediately address these problems and to improve living conditions and administrative processes across the Army as we discover them. As the troop surge progresses we will carefully monitor casualty evacuations and use all of the resources available to us to ensure we have the capacity and capability to ensure every soldier received the best medical care our Nation has to offer. If we need additional resources to accomplish this we will come back and ask Congress for those resources.

13. Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker, what is the Army doing to provide improved comfort and assistance to the families?

General SCHOOMAKER. At WRAMC we are revamping the way we support wounded soldiers and their families. We have created a Warrior Transition Brigade and added over 130 military positions to the leadership team that provides daily care and leadership for our medical holdover soldiers and creating new leadership posts for company commanders, first sergeants, and squad leaders. This substantially reduces the noncommissioned leader-to-led ratio at the platoon level (from roughly 1:55 to one closer to that which all Army units operate at 1:12). Just like soldiers in every unit in the Army, these soldiers now have a full chain of command, starting at the squad leader level, to look after their health and welfare. Among other improvements for our families, WRAMC leaders will begin greeting family members at the airport and escort them to the hospital, letting them know in word and deed that they and their soldiers have a working support system. We are creating a one-stop shopping Soldier and Family Assistance Center to bring together assistance coordinators, personnel and finance experts, and representatives from key support and advocacy groups such as the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program, the Red Cross, Army Community Services, Army Emergency Relief, and Veterans Administration (VA). Also, we have begun a more efficient and thorough system for transferring our Warriors in Transition from inpatient to outpatient status. At WRAMC, a complete review of our discharge management process resulted in a revision of standard operating procedures. We developed a discharge escort system whereby hospital staff, including the brigade leadership, comes to the soldier to conduct discharge business, escort the soldier to the brigade, and assist with luggage and transition into the unit. We instituted training to re-emphasize the importance of hospitality for our soldiers and their families.

14. Senator AKAKA. General Conway, has the Marine Corps experienced any problems in dealing with the numbers of wounded needing treatment after returning from Iraq or Afghanistan? If so, what steps are being taken to rectify the problem?

General CONWAY. The Navy is successfully caring for returning OEF/OEF casualties. The most difficult issues remain in the identification and treatment of mental health conditions. We are specifically taking steps in the areas of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), and the overall case management of casualties.

#### *Post-Traumatic Stress*

##### *Prevention:*

- Prevention is at the forefront of early identification and intervention of PTSD. We have embedded teams in the field Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) to promote prevention and early intervention. Closely aligned with warfighters while in garrison, providers instruct self-aid and buddy-aid training.
- Key to Force Health Protection and at the forefront of early identification is an emphasis on primary care delivered behavioral health services.
- Navy Medicine has established a Deployment Health Directorate, and identified a Combat/Operational Stress Control (COSC) consultant to coordinate prevention and treatment efforts.

##### *Identification:*

- Sailors and marines receive post-deployment health assessment (PDHA) immediately following deployment, and Post Deployment Health Reassessment 90–180 days later.
- Thirteen Deployment Health Centers (DHCs)—non-stigmatizing portals for identification and care—established at a cost of \$10 million. Through February 2007, DHCs saw more than 4,000 encounters (in excess of 3,700 primary care and 420 mental health visits).

*Treatment:*

- When intervention is necessary in theater, in accordance with the proximity, immediacy, expectancy, simplicity principles treatment occurs via embedded mental health personnel in deployed units (Marine Corps OSCAR teams and Carrier Group Clinical Psychologists).
- The Navy uses best practice guidelines for mental health treatment such as the VA/DOD jointly developed clinical practice guidelines.
- Navy has partnered with other services to establish a Center for Deployment Psychology, providing education and training on treatment of PTSD and other combat stress disorders.

*Traumatic Brain Injury*

- Navy medical personnel maintain heightened awareness to possible TBI-related symptoms in servicemembers using increased indices of suspicion when performing medical assessments. Unit medical personnel use the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE) developed by the Defense Veterans Brain Injury Center (DVBIC). The MACE is a battlefield screening tool used to identify symptoms in those servicemembers involved in blast events. Additionally, mental health personnel assigned to Marine Corps I Marine Expeditionary Force utilized the Combat Trauma Registry to document presenting symptoms, which included neuropsychological screening questions to identify TBI-related symptoms in marines seeking in-theater mental health care.
- Post-deployment screening occurs immediately following deployment using the PDHA, and again at 90 to 180 days using the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA). DOD plans additional TBI-related screening questions for the PDHA, the PDHRA, and the Periodic Health Assessment.
- All casualties evacuated to Bethesda National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) receive neuropsychological screening with appropriate treatment and follow-up for later-onset symptoms. Abnormal TBI screens receive 3-month follow-up, and referral to appropriate level of treatment as needed. A dedicated Bethesda NNMC database tracks all casualty treatment/follow-up. The Physical Evaluation Board process and VA OIF/OEF Coordinators also track patients to ensure continuity of care.

*Case Management*

- Case managers assist servicemembers and families with coordination, communication, education, resource management and advocacy. Since the start of the war there has been a shift of resources from noncasualty case management to predominantly OEF/OIF casualty management at locations receiving OEF/OIF casualties. Since 2003, the number of assigned case managers has increased from 94 to 112 in Navy medicine facilities.
- We are targeting an overall ratio of 1 case manager to 30 patients. The majority of our casualties are treated at NNMC, Bethesda, NMCS San Diego, Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton and Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune. We are adding six additional positions at Bethesda, four at San Diego, and one at Camp Lejeune. We are conducting a structured review of case management needs across all of Navy Medicine to assure adequate resourcing.
- In addition to clinical case management, the Marine Corps has very actively taken care of wounded marines through use of Marine Liaisons in our military treatment facilities (MTFs), the Marine for Life Program and the use of Wounded Warrior Barracks to make sure that marines are getting exactly what they need to get well. The Navy has developed the SAFE Harbor Program mirroring the success for Marine for Life.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

## READINESS

15. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, section 345 (Comptroller General Report on Readiness of Army and Marine Corps Ground Forces) to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 requires the Comptroller General to submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the readiness of the Active component and Reserve component ground forces of the Army and the Marine Corps no later than June 1, 2007. Specific report requirements include: current readiness status; ability of the Services to provide trained

and ready forces for ongoing operations; availability of equipment for training; current and projected requirements for repair or replacement of equipment; current personnel tempo and a comparison of such tempos to historical trends and an identification of particular occupational specialties that are experiencing unusually high or low deployment rates; and an analysis of retention rates in occupational specialties. Are you aware of this required Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that is due in 3 months that is exclusively focused on Army and Marine Corps readiness?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, the Army is aware of this effort.

General CONWAY. Comparing all marines accessed in fiscal year 2004, the average separation rate for marines with legal waivers was 7.2 percent as compared to 6.2 percent for marines with any waiver. The average misconduct separation rate for all marines was 4.6 percent.

16. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, is the Army and Marine Corps cooperating with the GAO on this report?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, the Army is cooperating with the GAO on this report.

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps is cooperating fully with the GAO.

#### DWELL TIME

17. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, the Services have identified the time that servicemembers spend at home station between deployments as "dwell time". During this period personnel and families are supposed to be given a respite. Sufficient dwell time affords deployed troops and families not only an opportunity to reintegrate into a non-deployed status, but also should provide: professional education opportunities, increase family time, training schedules that adequately prepare them for future deployments, extended equipment maintenance periods, and planned key leader and command changes. Can you explain how the escalation of troops has abbreviated dwell time for soldiers and marines?

General SCHOOMAKER. In order to meet the plus-up, OSD and the Joint Staff will have to use a combination of unit extensions (extending units in Iraq and Afghanistan beyond their 12 month rotation) and early deployments (sending units to Iraq and Afghanistan with less than 12 months at home). However, the Army will continue to only send units that are trained and ready for combat operations. The number one priority for the Army is setting security conditions for the democratically-elected governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to govern and police progress while placing emphasis on efforts to build up and advise indigenous security forces within their countries. The next-to-deploy forces are struggling to achieve just-in-time readiness. Redeployed units face significant reset challenges, primarily from resources and time available. The reset period is truncated due to the short time before next deployment and the unit dwell time which does not allow adequate time to reset equipment and train for full spectrum operations; however they will be trained to conduct the counter insurgency mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Army will continue to support the commanders in other theaters to locate, disrupt, and attack al Qaeda and associated terrorist networks worldwide with necessary forces which protect and deter against any actions toward our homeland. The resulting domino effect of the Army's manning, training and equipping efforts is the accelerated execution of field training exercises and deployments to training centers in order to conduct mission rehearsal exercises in preparation for deployment into theater. Additionally, in some instances new equipment fielding and training is conducted to ensure soldiers are equipped with and trained on the most modern equipment in the Army's inventory. Commanders at all levels endeavor to balance the very heavy burden of ensuring their units are manned, trained and equipped with the absolutely necessary requirement to ensure they have quality family time, respite from a year long combat tour and time for personal and professional development. Their ability to balance these competing but very necessary demands are challenged during the acceleration as they prepare to return to combat but, as has been proven during the early stages of the escalation of troops, have been successful.

General CONWAY. Assuming the recent surge (plus-up) lasts until Aug 07, 3 Infantry Battalions and 12 Battalion/squadron equivalents will temporarily break 1:1 dwell ratio. If the plus-up extends to February 2008, the number increases to 11 Infantry Battalions for a total of 23 Battalion/squadron equivalents that will temporarily break the 1:1 dwell ratio. We expect that their dwell would revert back to pre-surge levels after that rotation cycle.

18. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what training and maintenance has been curtailed?

General SCHOOMAKER. In the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, when a unit returns from an operational deployment, it is stabilized to enable the unit to recover and conduct maintenance to begin training to focus on the unit's next mission. Under current circumstances, units returning from Iraq or Afghanistan are stabilized for roughly 120 days, which allows personnel to take 30 days of leave, equipment to be repaired, and soldiers to attend needed schools. When a unit is required to redeploy within a year, it is given highest priority for filling manning and equipment shortages and maintenance on all equipment as early as possible. Maximum use is made of available pre-deployment training time and of the combat experience possessed by the soldiers and leaders in the unit who previously deployed to prepare the unit for its up-coming mission. Training for counterinsurgency operations is the focus of units, while training for conventional warfighting skills is curtailed. Through the monthly unit status report, the progressive increased readiness of a unit is closely monitored and, if needed, steps are taken to ensure that all units are fully trained prior to deployment.

General CONWAY. Deploying Marine Corps units and personnel continue to train for OIF/OEF deployment as specified by our pre-deployment training program. Battalions moved forward in their rotational cycle are subject to the same pre-deployment training standards as their fellow marines. We have accelerated the normal cycle through our main mission rehearsal exercise, Mojave Viper, to accommodate consistent training for all units rotating into theater. Flexibility in scheduling of Service Block III and IV advanced collective training has allowed completion of all training requirements in support of early deploying units.

Additionally, home station maintenance has not been curtailed due to the global war on terror or because of the 1:2 dwell time. The Marine Corps has emphasized the necessity to maintain home station equipment to ensure it is ready for unit training. As of 22 March 2007 maintenance readiness is 95 percent.

19. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, which units that are deploying have had to cancel their Mission Rehearsal Exercises at national training centers and have been forced to conduct reduced home-station training without premier training resources our national training centers offer?

General SCHOOMAKER. Two of the five plus-up brigades (4/2 SBCT and 2/3 HBCT) will conduct their MRE at home station in order to use the time that would have been required to transport personnel and equipment to a combat training center (CTC) at Fort Irwin or Fort Polk. Had more time been available, the units in question would have deployed and trained at a CTC. The decision to not execute the rotation at the CTC and conduct the training at home station is not taken lightly and is made by the senior leadership of the Army. Over the past 4 years, five BCTs (including the two most recent units) have conducted home station mission rehearsal exercise (MREs) to preserve time. About 20 days has been saved by these units. When a home station MRE is conducted, we bring the CTC to the home station, expert observer controllers, trained opposing forces, cultural and other role players and instrumentation to provide objective feedback to the unit are all moved to the home station. The tasks trained at home station MREs mirror those trained at the CTCs. By conducting a home station MRE, valuable time is given back to these units for training that would have been consumed loading, transporting, and unloading the equipment to a CTC.

General CONWAY. No Marine Corps units have cancelled unit predeployment training at Service training venues nor have any units reduced home-station training in support of the OIF force surge. Battalions moved forward in their rotational cycle will be subject to the same predeployment training standards as their fellow marines. We have accelerated the normal cycle through our main mission rehearsal exercise, Mojave Viper, to accommodate consistent training for all units rotating into theater. The early deployment of specific units did, in isolated cases, require the compression of scheduled Block I and II home-station training in order to meet Block III and IV training prerequisites, the execution of Block III and IV training, unit predeployment leave, and deployment latest arrival dates.

20. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, are divorce and separation rates increasing in the Army and the Marine Corps as a result of repeated deployments without allowing for proper dwell times?

General SCHOOMAKER. It is reasonable to assume that the stress of frequent deployments and the dangers affiliated with war do contribute to marital discord and divorce. However, the data does not support that stress of deployments and reduction of dwell time are the primary reason for increases in divorces, nor does it indi-

cate that there is a causal relationship between the two. A decision to end a marriage is generally multi-dimensional and one that is very individualized. Deployment separations often provide an opportunity for both husband and wife to re-evaluate their relationship; many times the decision to end a marriage is based on lack of commitment to the relationship. The United States is still actively involved in the war in Iraq, with a large number of soldiers deployed in theater. The fiscal year 2006 rate of divorce for officers is basically the same as it was in fiscal year 2002; and the rate of divorce for enlisted personnel in fiscal year 2006 is only slightly higher than fiscal year 2002.

The large number of soldiers deployed to theater, as well as the repeated deployments, could contribute to the desire for soldiers to separate from service; however, the number of enlisted soldiers who completed their service obligation and then separated from the Army in fiscal year 2006 was not significantly different from the number who completed their obligation and separated from service in fiscal year 2000 (pre-September 11). In fact, the number of soldiers who re-enlisted in the Army in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 was higher than it has been since the beginning of the Iraqi war.

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps divorce rate has remained relatively consistent over the last 3 years. Of note, each year the divorce rate of marines deployed in OIF/OEF or elsewhere is lower than that of those marines who have not deployed. However, because divorce is a personal issue between the individuals involved and all pertinent details cannot be captured in a database, we cannot draw further conclusions about the divorce rate of deployed versus nondeployed service men and women.

21. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, one of the keys to developing soldiers and marines is ensuring that they have time for professional education where they can absorb their experiences and deepen their thinking. What professional education classes and courses have been canceled or rescheduled as a result of reducing dwell time?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Active Army has neither cancelled nor rescheduled any resident-based professional education courses due to reduced dwell time. Since 2001, the Army has energetically transformed its professional education for soldiers to meet the Nation's needs in combating terrorism on a worldwide front. It is extremely important to the Army to ensure that soldiers have time for professional education courses for the reasons you've stated and others. These courses provide soldiers opportunities to share their operational experience with peers and faculty and receive and assimilate instruction on rapidly developing warfighting doctrine and broaden their intellectual horizons in preparation of future leader roles and responsibilities. The Army continues to adjust to operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan by exporting some of these courses to soldiers at their home station so they can go to school during the day and home to their families at night. In those cases where it is neither feasible nor beneficial to export a course, the Army compresses the course lengths and extends the training week. As a final initiative, the Army is reconfiguring its classroom instruction to a combination of resident and on-line instruction. This will result in the same level of education as previously provided, with the added benefit of keeping the soldier at home station longer.

General CONWAY. Only one program, the CMC National Fellows Program, has been suspended. The CMC National Fellows program was an outreach program that consisted of 10 fellowships with corporate America. The National Fellows Program was suspended because the needs of the operating forces were greater than the outreach program. No other professional education classes or courses have been canceled or rescheduled as a result of decreasing dwell time.

#### MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS

22. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, section 735 (Additional Elements of Assessment of Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health Relating to Mental Health of Members Who Were Deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)) to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directs that the DOD task force responsible for mental health assessments consider specific needs with respect to the mental health of deployed personnel. Specific task force requirements include: identifying conditions and disorders including PTSD, suicide attempts, and suicide; evaluation of the availability to members of assessments under the Mental Health Self-Assessment Program of the DOD; availability of programs and services under the Mental Health Self-Assessment Program; and recommendations on mechanisms for

improving the mental health services. Are you aware of the Mental Health Self-Assessment Program?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, we are well aware of the Mental Health Assessment Program. Information about the Self Assessment Program has been widely disseminated, and is on the new Army Behavioral Health Web site at [www.behavioralhealth.army.mil](http://www.behavioralhealth.army.mil). We have a broad array of more sophisticated screening instruments, to include the Post Deployment Health Assessment and Post-Deployment Health Re-Assessment, which involve a face to face encounter with a primary care provider. If clinically appropriate, the soldier is referred to a behavioral health provider. The DD Form 2796, Post-Deployment Health Assessment, screens for PTSD, major depression, concerns about family issues, and concerns about drug and alcohol abuse. The primary care provider reviews the form, interviews the soldier as required, and refers the soldier to a behavioral health care provider as required. The primary care provider may make referrals to onsite counselors or to MTFs. The DD Form 2900, the PDHRA of global health has a specific emphasis on mental health. The PDHRA screening program is offered to Active component and Reserve component soldiers deployed to a combat zone (only) 90 to 180 days post-deployment. There have been over 140,000 screenings performed. If following the re-assessment there are identified health care needs, soldiers will be offered care through by military medical treatment facilities, by VA medical centers or veterans centers, by private health care providers through TRICARE or through community-based health care organizations established by the Army.

General CONWAY. Yes, we are aware of the program and have participated in the task force.

23. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what is the status of the required reports?

General SCHOOMAKER. The task force has met on a regular basis and has diligently conducted its assessment since the appointment of the members on May 15, 2006. The task force is currently discussing its findings and recommendations and will deliver its report to the Secretary of Defense on May 15, 2007.

General CONWAY. We understand the task force is to submit the report to OSD Health Affairs in May 2007.

24. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what are the initial overall assessments of the mental health of the forces?

General SCHOOMAKER. The overall mental health of the Armed Forces is good as assessed by the Army Mental Health Advisory Teams annually since 2003. The stresses of war have had an unavoidable impact on the mental health of our Armed Forces, and the Army takes significant measures to monitor the mental health of soldiers and to care for the mental health of all servicemembers and their families. The Army fully supports the efforts of the DOD Mental Health Task Force in making its assessment of mental health care provided by the DOD to members of the Armed Forces and their families.

General CONWAY. The report will not be available until May 2007. As such, we have not had the opportunity to review the report assessments.

25. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what is the Army and the Marine Corps doing to address mental health illnesses and disorders identified by these initial reports?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army is committed to ensuring all soldiers receive the behavioral health care they need. An extensive array of mental health services has long been available. Since September 11, the Army has augmented behavioral health services and counseling. We anticipate a continued high demand for services and are committed to providing the necessary resources to respond. However, we do recognize that the behavioral health capacity is strained at many locations, including Alaska, Fort Hood, Fort Drum, and in several overseas locations. The Army recognizes the significant impact of war experiences on soldiers. A wide range of behavioral health services is available in the Army, including screening for PTSD and appropriate referrals for care. Historically and today, the most common and predictable mental health problem as a result of exposure to war and terrorism is PTSD. Unsurprisingly, as the global war on terrorism has continued, the number of cases of post-traumatic stress disorder has increased. PTSD is one of a range of deployment related psychological effects of war. Most combat veterans will have some of the symptoms of PTSD for weeks to months after their return, and perhaps fleetingly for the rest of their lives. Deployment also causes stress on marriages, Families and other relationships. Army programs are designed to build mental resiliency and toughness for soldiers and their Families. Positive post-deployment contact with

all soldiers, regardless of symptoms, is needed to support their ability to continue the global war on terrorism mission. Pro-active family support is integral to the success of soldier-directed behavioral health interventions as well. Some of the efforts follow. There is a robust combat and operational stress control presence in theater, with over 200 deployed behavioral health providers to Iraq alone. Mental health advisory team reports have demonstrated the success of these efforts. A new program, Re-engineering Systems of the Primary Care Treatment (of depression and PTSD) in the Military (RESPECT-MIL) is a new program designed to decrease stigma and improve access to care by providing behavioral health care in primary care settings. The pilot test at Fort Bragg was successful and the RESPECT-MIL program is now being implemented in 15 other Army locations. Numerous Battlemind products are in the process of development and/or have been implemented. These are training products designed to enhance recovery and resiliency. The Post-Deployment and Spouses Battlemind are available at [www.battlemind.org](http://www.battlemind.org).

General CONWAY. We have not yet seen the report, but we are working on preventing, identifying, and advocating for the treatment of mental illnesses and disorders in general, and especially those related to deployment. Among many other initiatives, a brief listing of notable Marine Corps actions follows.

The OSCAR Program: In 2004, the Marine Corps piloted the OSCAR Program, which embeds mental health assets in the active Marine Divisions throughout the deployment cycle, to improve access and continuity of care, and to improve trust and utilization of mental health services.

COSC Training and Monitoring: We require all commanders to implement standardized COSC training and monitoring in their units to ensure individual marines and their families receive necessary evaluation and treatment for deployment-related mental health issues and do not fall through the cracks. The Marine Operational Stress Surveillance and Training Program specifies the required briefs, screenings, and reporting required for all marines deployed for 90 days or more.

The Leaders Guide For Managing Marines in Distress: We developed the Marine Corps Leaders Guide for Managing Marines in Distress, a quick reference for leaders of marines at all levels which addresses high-risk, time-intensive issues affecting marines and their families (such as deployment-related stress, grief and loss, suicidal behavior, relationship problems, and legal and financial problems).

#### PILOT PROJECTS ON EARLY DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

26. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, section 741 (Pilot Projects on Early Diagnosis and Treatment of PTSD and Other Mental Health Conditions) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directs that the DOD carry out not less than three pilot projects to evaluate the various approaches to improving the capability of the military and civilian health care systems to provide early diagnosis and treatment of PTSD and other mental health conditions. Any pilot project carried out under this section would begin no later than October 1, 2007, and cease on September 30, 2008. Pilot projects will: evaluate effective diagnostic and treatment approaches for use by primary care; focus on members of the National Guard or Reserves who are located more than 40 miles from a military medical facility and who are served primarily by civilian community health resources; and provide outreach to the family members on PTSD and other mental health conditions. Are you aware of these pilot programs?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes. The Army Medical Department is developing several pilot projects for consideration by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

General CONWAY. We are aware of and participating in the Combat Stress Intervention Program project, which is a collaboration between the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington and Jefferson College, Conemaugh Health System, and others.

27. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, has the DOD identified the Army or the Marine Corps to participate in these pilot programs?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, the Army will be participating in a study led by Colonel Michael J. Roy, U.S. Army Medical Corps, looking at the use of virtual reality therapy and imaging in combat veterans with blast injury experiencing PTSD. This study will include patients with PTSD and traumatic brain injuries (TBI), to understand better the possible interaction of these two conditions. This is the first in a series of planned studies to improve the understanding of the impact of physical and psychological traumas in a combat environment, to examine the neurologic effects

of consequent sequelae including blast injuries and posttraumatic stress disorder, and to identify the most effective therapies available for PTSD. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and psychophysiologic indices will be used to differentiate subtle neurologic differences between groups of combat veterans. The efficacy of Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy will also be assessed.

General CONWAY. We are participating in the project cited above in question 26.

28. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, if you could design a pilot program, what areas would you focus on?

General SCHOOMAKER. The effectiveness of early diagnosis and treatment, while intuitively attractive, is not yet known. We would like to better assess which early interventions are most effective. There is a wide array of settings in which to do this, including with combat stress control teams, in primary care, behavioral health care, and with injured soldiers. Of critical importance, is to mitigate the interaction between psychological issues and mild TBI.

General CONWAY. We would focus on several areas, including:

- A prospective, longitudinal study evaluating biological, psychological, and social factors that predict resiliency to combat/operational stress in warfighters. Identifying the resiliency factors that can be promoted in warfighters before, during, and after deployment is one of our greatest and most important challenges. The Marine Corps is collaborating with the VA and several universities to conduct such a study with Marine ground combatants.
- A large-scale epidemiological study of the prevalence of the entire spectrum of deployment-related mental disorders and stress problems in the entire range of personnel exposed to combat/operational stress, including ground combatants, aviation personnel, combat service support personnel, medical personnel, chaplains, and Reserve component personnel of all types. Existing epidemiological research, mostly conducted by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, did not include all Services and all operational communities. Therefore, existing estimates of the prevalence of PTSD, depression, anxiety, substance use disorders, violence, and other stress problems are of questionable generalizability across Services and communities. The Marine Corps and its partners in Navy medicine have undertaken epidemiological research in Active component marines and sailors who have deployed with Marine units.

29. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what feedback from families and returning National Guard and Reserve members are you receiving on the availability of mental health treatments and resources?

General SCHOOMAKER. There has been much concern about the mental health needs of National Guard and Reserve soldiers and their Families. In many cases, they are in remote, rural locations with few mental health assets. These locations are underserved by mental health providers in general, and often a real paucity of TRICARE providers. There have been already interventions targeted towards this population, such as Military OneSource and the PDHRA. The VA has been very active in supporting the PDHRA. The States are providing services to their National Guard elements, to include mental health services. Many of the States have very proactive re-integration programs. For example, Minnesota has a very innovative program, which include reunions, education, and training at 30, 60, and 90 days. This strategy is proffered as a best practice guideline for the other states. However there is not a centralized ability to mandate any specific practices.

General CONWAY. Anecdotally, we are hearing some reports that there are problems with availability, particularly for child/adolescent psychiatric care and for reservists in remote areas, but we have not seen data to confirm this. Although there may be some difficulty with availability of services at MTFs and through TRICARE, our Marine and Family Services Counseling Centers have access to additional surge capacity available through a contract with the Military Family Life Consultant, Mental Health Network. This capacity has yet to be fully utilized. There are also services readily available in most locations through the Military OneSource face-to-face counseling benefit available for family members, which have also been under utilized. In both cases, the under utilization appears to be due to preference to use MCCS providers rather than contractors, who are perceived to be less familiar with military issues than our own providers. The Marine Corps is currently collaborating with the National Child Traumatic Stress Network and several universities to implement research to determine how current military operations are affecting Marine Corps families, and how well current mental health support services are meeting their needs.

TRAINING CURRICULA FOR FAMILY CAREGIVERS ON CARE AND ASSISTANCE FOR  
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

30. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, section 744 (Training Curricula for Family Caregivers on Care and Assistance for Members and Former Members of the Armed Forces with TBI) to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed that the DOD establish a panel, to be known as the 'Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver Panel', to develop coordinated, uniform, and consistent training curricula to be used in training family members in the provision of care and assistance to members and former members of the Armed Forces with traumatic brain injuries. Are you aware of this panel?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes. The Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center offered their resources and existing programs in this area to U.S. Army Medical Research & Materiel Command and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

General CONWAY. Yes. This panel is in development through the DVBIC.

31. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, has the DOD identified the Army or the Marine Corps to participate in these panels?

General SCHOOMAKER. To date, the Army is not aware of any decisions on this program and they have not been asked to contribute further.

General CONWAY. I anticipate representatives from all services will be invited to participate in this panel. I know that Headquarters, Marine Corps, Health Services (HQMC-HS) has received an invitation.

32. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, is there any specific feedback provided to you during your visits with soldiers and marines and their families on resources they are lacking when providing TBI treatment?

General SCHOOMAKER. We hear from families that they need assistance for after their family member goes home from hospital. Even those soldiers who are able to remain at duty and who perform well in a structured environment at work may have more difficulties at home when they then experience fatigue and irritability and more difficulty in the less structured environment, including parenting. Because of the established stigma to receiving care, and because of available resources, it can be difficult to get soldiers the medical care they very much need.

General CONWAY. Overall the feedback I have received is positive. There seems to be some variability in services depending on their location in the country. Marines living near Military Treatment Facilities or in large population centers have many resources available for treatment. For example, marines living in or near Camp Pendleton in southern California receive treatment from the local Naval Hospital, from the Naval Medical Center, San Diego, from the local VA and the poly-trauma center in Palo Alto, as well as several civilian institutions such as Scripps institute and Sharp rehabilitation center. Those living in more isolated areas have fewer resources available locally and may need help with transportation or finding creative solutions to their difficulties. There is a servicemember in Idaho who is 6 hours from their VA center in Denver. The VA has arranged for regular VTC follow up visits to minimize the need to make the long trip.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

33. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, according to a January 2007 report from Harvard University, TBI and PTSD are two of the common "signature wounds" sustained by Iraq and Afghan war veterans. We also know that both conditions require prompt identification and treatment. Unfortunately, distinguishing mild TBI from PTSD can be difficult since they have common symptoms—such as irritability, anxiety, and depression. However, knowledge of a soldier's or a marine's normal memory and cognitive skills prior to deployment could potentially improve post-deployment detection of mild TBI. Could you please discuss what predeployment tests are done on a soldier's or a marine's memory and cognition?

General SCHOOMAKER. There are certainly overlapping symptoms of PTSD and mild TBI. We are attempting to train our health care providers on both those topics. There are numerous updates in screening, education and treatment of TBI. The Army sent a message to all units in Iraq and Afghanistan last summer regarding screening and treatment of TBI in the theater of operations. The Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center developed new guidelines for the screening and treatment of mild TBI in November 2006. These guidelines have been disseminated to medical and behavioral health providers. During pre-deployment screening, all soldiers fill

out a pre-deployment screen, which is reviewed by a primary care provider. In that screen, there is not a detailed pen and paper test for memory and cognition. However, if the soldier reports any problems, they will be further evaluated.

Although PTSD and TBI have overlapping symptoms, they are different conditions with different mechanisms and clinical presentations. Early identification is critical and is being taught to military providers. Specifically, TBI results from mechanical forces to the head and a disruption in mental functioning. Thus, a soldier who is physically injured may have a brief period of being dazed or confused, and then experience headache, nausea, and vomiting thereafter, can be evaluated and identified as TBI. That same individual may later experience nightmares and flashbacks for the situation, which are not characteristic of TBI, but are characteristic of PTSD. That soldier may also be evaluated and identified as PTSD.

General CONWAY. There is currently no pre-deployment testing of a marine's memory or cognition for several reasons. There are no evidenced based studies to show that pre-testing in this population will aid in diagnosis and treatment either in the field or after return home. There is also no scientifically validated test available at this time for this population. Several existing tests are being evaluated and there is a study in progress to establish normal baselines for marines. Without established norms and validated testing tools, there is no meaningful way to either apply pre-deployment results to post-deployment changes or specifically attribute those changes to TBI. This baseline study is the first step in evaluating any benefit in pre-testing marines.

Even when a validated test is available and norms established, testing every marine will be an enormous challenge involving a significant cost and time commitment. Additional research questions that need to be answered include treatment recommendations for recruits who are below established norms on accession and for marines who are below norms on pre-deployment testing but have no history of exposure to blast or injury.

34. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what pre-deployment screening or tests are available for soldiers and marines with recent deployment and combat experience who are returning to combat, especially since some symptoms have not emerged during their dwell time and could potentially be triggered while experiencing combat for a second, third, or fourth time?

General SCHOOMAKER. All soldiers fill out a pre-deployment screen, which is reviewed by a primary care provider. In that screen, there is not a detailed pen and paper test for memory and cognition. However, if the soldier reports any problems, they will be further evaluated. It is certainly likely that soldiers may experience triggers of their PTSD symptoms. The Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center created a screening tool called the MACE using validated examinations from the Standardized Assessment of Concussion (SAC), to evaluate a person in whom a concussion is suspected. The MACE is currently being used by medics in theatre to confirm diagnosis and assess current clinical status. This information would be available to providers reviewing a pre-deployment assessment for a subsequent deployment; specific inquiries regarding prior symptoms would ensure that the soldier has recovered in the interim. Since the beginning of the war, the Army has had over 200 behavioral health providers in Iraq, including combat stress control teams and others, to help deal with PTSD, TBI, and other behavioral health issues. We have also revised and expanded the Army's Combat and Operational Stress Control course for behavioral health care providers. This redesigned course focuses more classroom time on managing soldiers who may have suffered PTSD during previous deployments.

General CONWAY. Marines are subject to a PDHA upon return and a PDHRA 90-120 days after returning from deployment. If these screens fail to identify a medical problem, then the predeployment health assessment should identify any medical problems which may impact their impending deployment. If a medical condition surfaces during deployment, they will receive appropriate evaluation and treatment, and possibly medical evacuation if warranted.

#### RESERVIST DEPLOYMENT POLICIES

35. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker, in your prepared statement you stress the importance of recent changes in reservist deployment policies and how this will allow the Army to rebalance the force and create more predictability for soldiers and families. Reserve deployments were managed on an individual basis. Now, deployments will be managed on a unit basis. The changed policy also addresses the 18-month maximum mobilization time for members of the Reserve Forces, and reduces

the maximum mobilization timeframe to 1 year. Involuntary mobilization of Guard/Reserve units will remain a 1-year mobilized to 5-year demobilized ratio. However, a requirement exists where certain selected Guard/Reserve units will be remobilized sooner than the current policy goal. How are these new policies and requirements being managed within the Army?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army is currently mobilizing Reserve component units in accordance with the mobilization policy set forth in the Secretary of Defense's Memorandum of January 19, 2007, "Utilization of the Total Force." The Army is adjusting planned rotations in order to comply with the new policy. The Army is shifting training, which has traditionally been conducted during post-mobilization, to the pre-mobilization period in order to maximize units' operational employment time in theater. This will help to ensure unit stabilization in predictable cycles so that we may continue to mobilize, train, and equip Reserve component soldiers and units to meet the needs of the combatant commander.

36. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, how much sooner than the current policy goal will selected Guard/Reserve units be remobilized?

General SCHOOMAKER. Operational demands will determine what capabilities will be required and how often units will need to mobilize. Once a capability is determined mission essential by the combatant commander in theater, the Army will identify the specific unit to fill the requirement based on the unit's capability, current readiness levels, previous mobilization(s), and dwell time. It is important to note that the 1:5 (1 year mobilized to 5 years at home) ratio is a planning objective under the new policy and the Secretary of Defense acknowledges that operational requirements will drive the frequency of mobilizations for units.

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps is using a Force Generation Model for its Reserve component based on 1 year activation to 4 years of dwell. This model, approved prior to publication of the current policy goal of 1 year activation to 5 years dwell, provides the necessary predictability for our force planners, the Reserve marine, his family and his employer. Deployment assignments within the model are based on unit combat readiness as well as dwell time considerations. Most Marine Reserve units will have greater than 4 years dwell with four of our infantry battalions meeting or exceeding the current policy goal.

As the Marine Corps Active component end strength increases to 202,000 and the 1:2 dwell is achieved, we expect the Reserve component to be able to restructure the Force Generation Model to more closely reflect the current policy goal of 1 year activation to 5 years dwell.

37. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, will these units be filled by individuals placed into ad-hoc units and organizations, and if they are, doesn't that violate the spirit of the new policy and prolong the period before you will be able to reset the Reserve and National Guard Forces?

General SCHOOMAKER. A minimum number of Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers will be cross leveled to fill mobilizing units through out a transitional period immediately following the implementation of new mobilization policy. These mobilizing units will not be ad-hoc but rather existing units which will have a limited number of individuals assigned to bring them up to their required end strength to deploy. Every effort is made to ensure that the impact to National Guard units that are not deploying, soldiers, and their Families are minimized. Additionally, proposed compensation in the form of transferable education benefits to Family members, medical and dental coverage, and long term civilian schooling options, coupled with other creative compensation for soldiers who have their dwell break interrupted, will help minimize losses and the need for cross leveling thus improving reset and ARNG readiness.

It may in fact take longer to reset the ARNG. However, with the new mobilization policy, the requested authority provided for the ARNG to craft new stabilization policy beginning at alert (up to 12 months prior to mobilization, coupled with minimal cross leveling at the time of sourcing (year three of the ARFORGEN cycle), the ARNG can replace soldiers prior to platoon/company collective training. All of which further supports mobilization as a well trained, fully synchronized unit.

The ARNG recognizes the potential for this to prolong the reset period and continues to modify its plan in reaching the steady state of the ARFORGEN cycle at the earliest possible date, while continuing to support the Army's needs for the global war on terror.

General CONWAY. Marine Reserve units will be employed as either whole units or as detachments based on the force requirements. Due to past policies, a requirement for some cross-leveling remains necessary initially; however, we believe implementation of the Force Generation Model will minimize and eventually eliminate

the need for cross-leveling to form whole units. We believe we are acting within the spirit and the intent of the new policies and we will be able to reset the force sooner rather than later.

#### SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL GUARD TRANSITION

38. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, section 676 (Special Working Group on Transition to Civilian Employment of National Guard and Reserve Members Returning from Deployment in OIF or OEF) to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directs that the DOD establish a working group to identify and assess the needs of members of the National Guard and Reserve returning from deployment in OIF or OEF in making the transition to civilian employment on their return from such deployment. Are you aware of this working group?

General SCHOOMAKER. The OSD for Reserve Affairs has the lead on this issue. We understand they will collaborate with the Department of Veteran Affairs and the Department of Labor to identify and assess the needs of members of the National Guard and Reserve returning from deployment in OIF/OEF and assist in the transition to civilian employment. The National Guard Bureau created a working group, within the Army, to examine these issues. They produced a proposal for improving Reserve component reintegration which is currently being staffed within the Department of the Army.

General CONWAY. Yes, I am aware of the working group. My staff (M&RA) has been in contact with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA) Action Officer responsible for coordinating the convening of the working group. It is our understanding the working group will be an interagency group comprised of members of the DOD, Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Labor. It is also our understanding the working group is scheduled to convene in mid April 2007.

39. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, what challenges are you aware of that national guardsmen and reservists are facing when they transition to civilian employment?

General SCHOOMAKER. Reserve component soldiers face a variety of challenges when transitioning from active status back to their civilian employment. Medical practitioners have great challenges in getting their patients back. During the soldiers' absence their patients went to other medical providers to get the care they needed.

Self-employed or small business owners face unique problems after being away from that business for any period of time. Reestablishing the business can be challenging, costly and time consuming. In addition, numerous soldiers work for small businesses. Some of those businesses are not familiar with the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 reemployment provisions. The State committees for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) can provide assistance to resolve those problems once a business is aware of their obligations.

Soldiers who are students have a difficult time resuming their studies where they left off. Soldiers who depart in mid-semester have both an academic problem and financial problem. Fortunately, most university and colleges are very understanding and make consideration for deploying soldiers.

General CONWAY. Fortunately, we have seen very few cases where returning Reserve marines have problems with their employer. We currently have an excellent working relationship with the office of the ESGR and incorporate their products and message into our preactivation/predeployment preparation in order to educate our marines, their commanders, and their employers on everyone's responsibilities to each other. Two-way communication between the marine and their employer is essential to success. One of the challenges we have been addressing within the Marine Corps is to provide our marines, their families, and their employers with greater clarity on what is expected of the marine. For example, when will the marine deploy?; how long will he/she be gone?; what benefits does the marine expect the employer to cover while activated? The Secretary of Defense's recent adjustment of the Department's activation policy is a step in the right direction to better assist us in managing the expectation of not only our individual marines, but also their families and their employers.

Note: The Marine Corps does not maintain any statistics on conflicts between Reserve marines and their employers; however, OASD/RA provided the following statistics from the latest Status of Forces survey (May 2006)

where the results indicate that 79 percent of OIF/OEF activated servicemembers return to work for the same employer while 19 percent go to work for a different employer. Of those returning to the same employer, 17 percent reported that their employer reintegration experience was worse than they expected.

40. Senator CLINTON. General Schoomaker and General Conway, if the working group recommendations are not timely, what suggestions or policies have you implemented to ease transition?

General SCHOOMAKER. There are several programs in place that provide a great service to our soldiers. The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) is a big success for soldiers transitioning from military life. This program provides many services to include assistance with writing a resume and finding a job, providing points of contact for service providers, advice on benefits for education and training, briefings on the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act, briefings on veteran's benefits, finances and assisting soldiers in setting up individual transition plans. The Army seeks to ensure every demobilizing soldier with more than 180 days of active duty is given the opportunity to utilize ACAP.

All Reserve component soldiers are eligible for follow-up services with ACAP for an additional 180 days after demobilization because the Army recognizes that many Reserve component soldiers have limited time during the demobilization process. The National Guard Bureau has created a working group to examine this issue. The working group produced a proposal for improving Reserve component reintegration which is currently being staffed within the Department of the Army.

Additionally, the ESGR is a great resource for soldiers experiencing reemployment difficulty. Through information services and informal mediation, the ESGR will assist in preventing, resolving, or reducing employer and/or employee problems and misunderstandings that result from National Guard or Reserve membership, training, or duty requirements. ESGR has a national network of over 900 volunteer ombudsmen who help resolve issues between employers and their employees who serve in the National Guard and Reserve. Every demobilizing soldier is briefed on the services ESGR offers.

General CONWAY. Communication between the marine and his employer remains probably the single most important thing we can do to ensure everyone's expectations are managed. Within the Marine Corps I have recently approved the Long War Force Generation Model (LWFGM) outlining Reserve unit activation requirements in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom for the Marine Corps through 2011. Through the LWFGM we are better able to provide our marines, their families, and their employers with a greater level of predictability to assist in managing their respective lives and businesses. This in turn should translate to better expectation management on the part of the marine and their employer upon the marines reintegration back into their civilian life.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

##### READINESS FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DOMESTIC NATIONAL DISASTERS

41. Senator MCCAIN. General Schoomaker, the Army has played a critical role historically in ensuring the Nation's security at home and can expect to play an even greater role in the future to counter terrorist attacks and respond to other domestic emergencies. While the Department of Homeland Security has the lead responsibility for homeland security, recent disasters, such as hurricane Katrina, suggest that the DOD—and the Army and National Guard in particular—must be prepared to make up for any deficiencies. How do you see the war in Iraq and operations in Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army and National Guard Forces that may be called upon to respond to an attack or other incident or disaster in the United States?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army's capability to provide trained and ready forces to NORTHCOM or in the case of States, the capability of the National Guard to respond to the requirements of the Governors, is a by-product of the capability to accomplish wartime missions that our forces are organized and designed to perform. Army forces deploying into combat continue to be the best led and are manned, trained and equipped for the missions they are assigned. The pace of current operations and our commitment to fully manning, training, and equipping our deploying forces for their assigned missions leaves holes in the readiness of our next to deploy units. However, as the magnitude of the response to Hurricane Katrina indicates—despite holes in the force readiness—there is still considerable residual capability

in all components of the Army, to include the ARNG, to respond in the event of catastrophic incident or attack.

42. Senator McCAIN. General Schoomaker, currently, most forces assigned to homeland defense and civil support missions also have a warfighting role which could detract from their availability and readiness to perform the homeland defense mission. What are the pros and cons of establishing units dedicated to the homeland defense mission?

General SCHOOMAKER. It is true that most of the forces with assigned homeland defense mission also have warfighting roles. The Army established the following units with dedicated homeland defense missions:

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams (CST). The Secretary of the Army has certified 49 WMD-CST in the National Guard. Each CST has 22 highly trained Air and Army Guard soldiers on-call 365 days per year ready to respond within 6 hours from notification. The CST program quickly established itself as a highly reliable and credible homeland defense capability. Since their creation, these units have been called to duty more than 2,000 times to respond to suspected chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents in support of local first responders at airports, schools, and other public facilities across the Nation. As the first military unit on the ground, CSTs provide strategic reconnaissance and situational awareness from the incident site through the State to the National Command Authority.

b. CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP). The Army established 12 CERFP teams that provide decontamination, medical support, and search and rescue capabilities. The CERFPs are regionally aligned with the 10 FEMA regions, the National Capital Region, and the west coast/Pacific region. Units and troops assigned to the CERFP train and remain dedicated to the mission for 1 to 2 years between their combat rotations and can be on-scene within 24 hours due to their regional distribution. CERFPs are not dedicated to the homeland defense mission; they are dual missioned forces that have both their normal warfighting role and an additional CONUS CBRNE consequence management role.

c. National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System (NCR IADS). The NCR IADS has provided a rotational National Guard Air Defense Battalion in the NCR since 2001. This force is linked directly with the North American Aerospace Defense Command to provide continuous protection from air attacks in the NCR.

The pros of dedicating units are:

a. Assigning forces to a solely Homeland Defense (HD)/Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission would make it possible to man and equip them for these tasks. In turn, their war-related equipment, not needed for HD/DSCA could be transferred to deploying units.

b. These units would also be able to focus on training for the Command and Control (C2) of a HD/DSCA mission. As it currently stands, forces are hard pressed to train for the unique C2 requirements of this joint, inter-agency mission.

c. Dedicated forces would allow for habitual training relationships with their supported command and among each other.

d. Cross-fertilization of skills and equipment needed for the overseas mission and the homeland defense mission has resulted in increased capabilities in our Army. As an example, the HAZMAT equipment set originally designed for Army Reserve Chemical Units in a Homeland Defense mission provided the basis of the equipment set issued to our forces overseas to detect Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Materials.

However, the cons to dedicating units are:

a. Pulling units out of the service force generating rotation schedule increases stress on the remainder of the force, which segregates units into different mission sets reduces the Army's strategic depth and flexibility.

b. Transferring combat equipment out of these dedicated units creates non-deployable units. Such dedicated forces, not capable of deployment, may be better placed in the Department of Homeland Defense.

c. Homeland Defense tasks for units are near identical to warfight tasks, i.e. medical, transportation, engineer, CBRN defense, military police, medical evacuation, maintenance, security forces, supply, communications, personnel, etc.

d. The number of dedicated units will be limited, and at times, sourcing may not be in the proximity of the mission area. The Federal response may be faster using non-dedicated State and Federal forces which are broadly distributed in CONUS. This is a key principle of the current National Guard support to State efforts that has proven highly successful and will leverage the geographic dispersion of capabilities.

43. Senator MCCAIN. General Schoomaker, how is the Army ensuring that its chemical units that are tasked to respond to a domestic CBRNE attack are at a high level of readiness, given their dual-tasking to both overseas and homeland defense missions?

General SCHOOMAKER. The U.S. Army Chemical Corps is undergoing transformation. General purpose chemical units are being given some of the capabilities currently resident only in specialized chemical units. For example, the Hazard Response Decontamination (HRD) platoons will enable our general purpose chemical units to assess (identify and detect) hazards, thereby reducing the mission requirements of specialized chemical units. Through the HRD platoon concept, we will enable our general purpose units to detect more agents for those non-traditional hazards they might encounter on overseas and HLD missions and to support personnel or mass casualty decontamination operations. Equipping changes will provide hazard response equipment to the platoons in addition to their traditional CBRNE equipment.

The Army's Chemical Corps transformation expands the chemical units' capability to prevent and mitigate the effects of CBRN agents through enhanced early warning, disposal, detection, identification, and decontamination capabilities.

These capabilities have been achieved through the following:

- Creating dismounted CBRN reconnaissance in Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) CBRN reconnaissance platoons,
- Increasing Special Forces recon detachments to 14 soldiers,
- Activating 110th Chemical Battalion (tech escort),
- Activating 48th Chemical Brigade (initial operating capability October 1, 2007), and
- Improving flexibility and capabilities of tech escort battalions.

In addition, the Army began its first armored CBRN reconnaissance modernization since Desert Storm by fielding the Stryker Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) in 2006. Combined, the DOD Chem-Bio Defense Program and the Army have programmed over \$1 billion in funding to procure 190 of these systems across the Future Years Defense Plan. These systems will bring Army CBRN reconnaissance units to their highest readiness levels in 20 years. However, meeting the Army requirement will require additional procurement of 86 vehicles.

The Army is also achieving transformation results through actions taken based on the outcomes of the Quadrennial Defense Review. A WMD Elimination capability will become fully operational by fiscal year 2009 in the 20th Support Command (SUPCOM). This new capability will expand the 20th SUPCOM's current capability to support worldwide CBRNE operations in support of combatant commanders and other Federal agencies. By fiscal year 2009, the unit will have the capability to command and control assigned CBRNE forces, conduct CBRNE technical advice and assistance, maintain technical reach back to national laboratories, and provide training, readiness, and oversight of specialized CBRNE force capabilities.

Additionally, 12 ARNG chemical units will be integrated into a CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) to provide state governors, and or the Federal Government, a task-organized Army response force providing casualty extraction, mass decontamination and medical treatment capabilities.

Since 1999, the U.S. Army Reserve Chemical Decontamination and Reconnaissance platoons have trained on those tasks needed to respond to CBRN-CM incidents in the United States. This has included training HAZMAT qualified reconnaissance soldiers to work with our Nation's first responders and training selected soldiers on mass casualty decontamination procedures. These HAZMAT skills have been put to use in Iraq.

#### CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE

44. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, the 500-man Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) is one of the U.S. military's premier capabilities for assisting local, State, or Federal agencies and designated combatant commanders in the conduct of consequence management in the event of a chemical, bio-

logical, or nuclear terrorist attack. Does the Marine Corps plan to expand this important capability? If not, why not?

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps developed CBIRF as an interim solution to an interagency capabilities gap until an enduring interagency capability could be developed. Examples of capabilities that have since been developed, or are in the process of being developed, include the U.S. Public Health Service National Medical Response Teams' Weapons of Mass Destruction and the National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages that can respond under the authority of the Governors before Federal forces respond. It is important to remember that in accordance with the National Response Plan, local and State first responders will respond before Federal agencies. DOD will respond at the direction of the President, or Secretary of Defense, as part of the overall Federal response in support of the State and local first responders.

CBIRF is an interim solution to a gap in the Nation's capability to respond to chemical or biological incidents. It is not intended to be a long-term, permanent solution in Marine Corps capabilities. Consequently, there is no plan to substantially expand current capability. Any planned enhancement of CBIRF, however, would be in support of the Marine Corps title 10 responsibilities, roles, and missions.

45. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, what is the requirement for such a capability?

General CONWAY. The geographic combatant commanders have general requirements for CBRNE consequence management capabilities. The Marine Corps CBIRF can be sourced by the Joint Force Provider as a force to help provide those required capabilities.

46. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, what is this requirement based on?

General CONWAY. Marine Corps Commandant General Krulak recognized a critical gap in the ability of the U.S. Government to respond to chemical or biological incidents following the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attacks on the Tokyo Subway system using Sarin gas. Consequently, he directed the development of CBIRF as an interim capability until an enduring government-wide capability could be developed. In the interim, CBIRF continues to be a force that can be sourced to meet the requirements of the geographic combatant commanders, to include Commander, U.S. Northern Command, for CBRNE consequence management requirements.

47. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, are there ways that the other Services, the National Guard, and civilian first responders might benefit from the extensive training and experience resident in the CBIRF unit?

General CONWAY. In accordance with the "lead—support—enable" construct of the Department of Defense's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the Marine Corps' efforts to enable first responders' capabilities includes training between CBIRF, National Guard units, and civilian responders.

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

